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INTRODUCTION 
From its inception the B-2 Advanced Technology Bomber was 
signif icant role in the Cold War strategic environment. 
designed for a 
Al though this 
environment of US-Soviet confrontation has now passed, the future shape of any 
global nuclear balance remains unclear. Accordingly, it is useful to look at 
both the established arguments for introducing the B-2 in the context of the 
US-Soviet confrontation and at possible new roles in the post-Cold War era. 
The official unveiling of the B-2 in November 1987 opened another chapter in 
the controversial debate concerning modernisation of the United States strategic 
bomber force. Questions regarding viability, utility, and cost-effectiveness have 
again been asked. In considering the earlier phases of the modernisation debate, 
it is worth noting that the B-2 programme has a close precedent in the form of 
the North American Valkyrie (USAF designation: B-70) programme cancelled in the 
1960s. 
Like the present B-2 programme, the B-70 was a costly and technologically 
demanding programme. It envisaged a large, delta-winged, supersonic strategic 
bomber carrying a wide variety of nuclear and conventional ordnance, flying 
unrefuelled to target and back (some 7600 nautical miles) at Mach 3. After 
consideration of the mission and overall cost both President Kennedy and 
Secretary of Defense McNamara concluded that the programme should be restricted 
to perhaps two or three aircraft dedicated to research and development only. The 
reasons given by both men provide interesting reading in the context of the B-2 
debate. 
President Kennedy stated that the development of the B-70 "as a full weapons 
system at this time [is] unnecessary and economically unjustifiable, ,,1 while 
McNamara argued we have again re-studied the role of the B-70 in our strategic 
retaliatory forces ... 
will not provide enough 
its very high cost. 2 
and again we have reached the conclusion that the B-70 
of an increase in our offensive capabilities to justify 
He went on to add later that the strategic forces programmed through 1967 could 
achieve practically complete destruction of the enemy target system even after 
absorbing an initial attack [and the addition of 200 B-70s or 150 RS-70s] either 
of which would cost about $10 billion, would not appreciably change this result. 3 
The abandonment of the B-70 programme by 1969 left the manned bomber leg of 
strategic nuclear triad supported by the increasingly elderly B-52. Despite the 
addition to the bomber fleet of the B1-B in the 1980s, questions remain regarding 
1. Cited in Desmond BaLL, PoLitics and Force LeveLs. The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy 
Administration, (University of CaLifornia Press, Los AngeLes, 1980), p.216. 
2. Ibid, pp.217-218. 
3. Ibid, p.218. 
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the manned bomber force's vulnerability to reduced tactical warning brought about 
by significant improvements in Soviet Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBNs) and 
Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). Should the Soviet Union4 become 
able to str ike more of the Strateg ic Air Command (SAC) 5 bases and barrage 
aircraft egress routes, the effect on the manned bomber force could be 
devastating. The various assessments of bomber retaliatory capability after a 
surprise attack project a rather low figure of 1000 warheads to target. 
Solutions aimed at easing dependence on minimal warning and minimising the impact 
of expected SSBN and SLBM improvements remain problematic. 
Nonetheless, there is vigorous justification of the manned bomber, including: 
their role in enhancing the survivability of silo-based Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and vice versa; that they are the most capable method 
of conducting large-scale retaliatory attacks against hard targets; are 
recallable and reusable after launch; and complicate Soviet air defence efforts. 
Equally vigorous counters are offered, so the debate over maintaining bombers 
continues. Moreover, the development of the B-2 has served to refocus attention 
on the viability, utility and cost-effectiveness of the strategic penetrating 
bomber in particular. 
The previously highly secret B-2 bomber, revealed to the public some eight 
years after research was first begun, represents a maj or development in 
aerodynamic, avionic and materials technology. As with many highly technical 
programmes, however, the B-2 bomber has experienced a number of potentially 
serious production, performance and management problems. 
As a result there has been a tremendous rise in the cost of the programme. A 
key contributor is the cut in aircraft numbers from 132 to 75 to 20, which result 
in a per unit cost approaching 2.26 billion dollars. Adding to these cost woes is 
the recent admission by the USAF that the B-2 is not as stealthy as first thought 
and that certain specif ications may have to be relaxed. There is now a real 
possibility that the B-2 will be unable to perform some of its prescribed 
missions. 
A cornerstone of the USAF's case for the B-2 is the identification of a 
plausible mission. From its inception the aircraft's primary mission was to 
penetrate Soviet airspace and hunt strategic relocatable targets such as nuclear , 
mobile missiles. The technical complexities of such a mission and the doubtful 
4. Following an abortive coup attempt against President Gorbachev in August 1991, the Soviet Union now ceases 
to exist as a unified entity. With the exception of the Baltic States and Georgia, the former Soviet 
Republics are now referred to as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan 
and Belarus are the only states that retain strategic nuclear weapons however, the latter three have 
expressed a desire to discard nuclear weapons entirely. Russia, which remains by far the largest and 
military powerful state, is to retain nuclear weapons and controls all of the former Soviet Union's SSBN 
fleet. 
5. On 27 September 1991, President Bush announced that SAC would be replaced by a new unified Strategic Command 
which will incorporate the peacetime nuclear alert force - land based ICBMs, the Navy SSBNs and manned 
bombers and tankers. The USAF portion of the force will be drawn from the new Air Combat Command, which 
merges fighter, bomber, reconnaissance, missile forces and Air Mobility Command which includes the bulk of 
air lift and tanker assets. The changes took effect in June 1992. "Statement to the Nat i on, II Pres i dent 
George Bush text Reprinted in Reuters, 27 September 1991. 
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viability of alternative nuclear roles has caused the USAF to look more closely 
at conventional roles. This interest in promoting the conventional utility 
strategic weapons such as heavy bombers gained considerable momentum with the 
Gulf war and developments in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Accordingly the 
B-2 will now be oriented toward conventional rather than more dubious nuclear 
missions. On a similar note, the significance placed by the USAF on the generous 
bomber counting rules allowed under Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) has 
faded. Declining bomber numbers, the small B-2 force size and the contraction of 
nuclear targets have detracted from its earlier value. 
The fate of B-2 programme was settled 
announcement that no more than 20 aircraft 
with President Bush's January 
would be produced. As a result 
Congressional opposition has dissolved but funding for the remaining aircraft 
depends on Pentagon assurance that the $44.4 billion programme cost will not rise 
and that the aircraft will be as steal thy as advertised. The B-2, like its 
predecessors, has been dogged by controversy but with cancellation no longer an 




THE MANNED BOMBER AND THE NUCLEAR TRIAD 
Modernising the Triad 
For over twenty-five years US deterrence capability has rested on a triad of 
bomber aircraft, submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and silo-based 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Together these forces present a 
complex set of targeting and defence countermeasure problems for a potential 
attacker, and provide a hedge against changes in threat and technological 
breakthrough that might render one leg of the triad vulnerable or obsolete. 
Each has its own unique features. Silo-based ICBMs are presently the most 
accurate means of striking hard targets and have particularly reliable command, 
control and communications (C3 ). While attacks on submarines and bombers away 
from US bases may be disavowable, ICBMs can only be threatened now by a large 
strike against US territory. Also, due to the different time-to-target ratio 
between the strategic forces, ICBMs can provide cover for a manned bomber cruise 
missile carrying force, and vice-versa. 1 The ballistic missile carrying 
submarines (SSBNs), with their ability to stay submerged and hidden for long 
periods, are presently the most survivable element in the triad, thus 
constituting the best strategic reserve force. Should either or both of the 
land-based legs be destroyed SSBNs would become the primary counterforce weapons. 
Another advantage is their ability to attack from all azimuths, which serves to 
stretch and dilute Soviet air defences. 2 The manned bomber has advantages such as 
recallability, flexibility and reusability. 
The key element of the triad's credibility is obviously the survivability of 
its component parts. While SSBN currently face no immediate threat, the same 
cannot be said for silo-based ICBMs and manned bombers. Qualitative improvements 
in Soviet SSBNs and SLBMs have raised serious doubts about the ability of US 
ICBMs and bombers to survive a surprise attack. In order to address this 
destabilizing situation, President Reagan appointed, in late 1982, the Bipartisan 
Commission on Strategic Forces (known as the Scowcroft Commission after its 
Chairman) in an effort to establish political consensus on the modernisation of 
strategic forces, especially ICBMs. The Commission's report, submitted in April 
1983, stated that "strategic forces must be modernized, as necessary, to enhance 
to an adequate degree their overall survivability.,,3 For ICBMs, this essentially 
1. Colin Gray, The MX ICBM and National Security, (New York 1981), p.39. 
2. Barry Schneider, IIDyad or Triad?1I Defense and Diplomacy, vol.?, no.9 (September 1989): p.33. 
3. Report of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, by Brent Scowcroft, Chairman (Washington, D.C. , 
April 1983), p.6. 
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invol ved research and development toward deployment of mobile small , single 
warhead ICBMs (SICBMs) called Midgetman, and deployment of 100 multiple-warhead 
(MIRVED) MX Peacekeeper ICBMs in Minuteman silos. 
A most acrimonious and protracted debate followed regarding both systems. The 
plan to deploy a full compliment of 100 Peacekeeper missiles suffered a major 
set-back when the Bush Administration rejected USAF plans to keep half the 
missiles in silos while the remainder were made mobile. Eventually it was decided 
to remove the existing 50 Peacekeepers from their silos and mount them on 25 
trains carrying two missiles each. This concept, known as rail-garrison basing, 
envisaged Peacekeeper travelling on the existing US rail network during crises 
but being stationed at SAC bases under normal circumstances. 4 The Midgetman, if 
deployed, would be based on hardened mobile launchers operating on large military 
reservations and Minuteman bases in peacetime. 
would disperse into an area of about 20, 000 
difficult to precisely locate and destroy. 
On strategic warning the force 
square ki lometres, 5 making it 
On 27 September 1991 the future of both systems was settled when President Bush 
announced a series of sweeping arms reduction measures in response to changes in 
the former Soviet Union. 6 The Peacekeeper rail-garrison plan and the 
mobile-basing option for Midgetman were cancelled and four months later, the 
President announced the scrapping of Midgetman entirely with the Peacekeeper to 
be retired if the Republics of the former Soviet Union agree to eliminate land 
based MIRVED Systems. 7 While the President's decision undoubtedly reflects the 
realities of the ending of the cold war, the problems outlined in the 1983 
Commission Report remain unresolved. 
The Bomber survivability Debate 
Throughout the survivability debate, there has been one recurring factor which 
plays a key role in the pre-launch survivability of both ICBMs (mobile or not) 
and manned bombers strategic and tactical warning. 8 I f one follows the 
well-supported wisdom of the former Commander-in-Chief, Strategic Air Command 
General John Chain on this matter, then only two strategic nuclear attack 
scenarios appear likely. The first would have US forces already on full alert 
4. For detaiLed anaLysis on the raiL-garrison MX PLan see in particuLar, Robert ZirkLe, "RaiL -Garrison MX ... 
No Way to Run a RaiLroad," Arms ControL Today, vol.17, no.8 (October 1987): pp.17-21; and Barry FridLing 
and John Harvey, liOn the Wrong Track? An Assessment of MX RaiL-Garrison Basing," InternationaL Security, 
voL.13, no.3 (Winter 1988-1989): pp.113-141. 
5. See ALbert Gore Jr, "Verification of Arms ControL Limits on MobiLe MissiLes," in M. Krepon and M. Umberge r 
(eds), Verification and CompLiance: A ProbLem-SoLving Approach, (London 1988), p.S. 
6. AnnuaL Report to the President and Congress - Report of the Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, (Washington , 
D.C., February 1992), p.S9. 
7. Ibid. 
8. Strategic warning is warning that the Soviets may be preparing for a nucLear attack but have not yet 
Launched their forces. TacticaL warning is warning that an attack is underway; it is provided by systems 
such as Launch detection sateLLites and earLy warning radars. A characteristic time for tacticaL warning is 
30 minutes or Less, the time it wouLd take Soviet baLListic missiLes to reach targets in the US. Strategic 
warning wouLd provide severaL hours, days, or perhaps weeks of warning of attack . 
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because conventional war had begun in Europe and the second would involve a 
nuclear "bolt out of the blue". While the second scenario is considered unlikely 
cr i tics argue that a surpr ise attack cannot be totally discounted. In short, 
American policy-makers should not be complacent about receiving strategic 
warning. 9 Several facts about the Soviet Union's SSBN fleet call into question 
the reliability of strategic warning. Firstly, Soviet SSBNs have been carrying a 
significantly increased number of warheads - from an average of 13 in the mid 
1970s to 50 in the late 1980s. 10 This enables greater coverage of the US 
land-based target set. Secondly, the quietening of Soviet SSBNs reduced the 
effectiveness of US passive sonar such as the Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS). 
Furthermore, quietening of SSBNs might continue to outpace technological advances 
in anti-submarine warfare. A result of these quantitative and qualitative 
improvements, according to one analyst, will be that: 
SAC will no longer be able to count on 30 minutes of tactical 
warning, as it can in some scenar ios today. Instead, SAC 
could be threatened by SLBM attacks with flight times of 
10-15 minutes from the near Atlantic and near Pacific, 18-20 
minutes from the near Arctic, or 20-25 minutes from the far 
Arctic near the Soviet coast. Even more ominously, SLBM 
flight times will be under 10 minutes if the Soviet Union 
tests and deploys depressed trajectory SLBMS. 11 
The effect on the manned bomber force could be devastating. With an overall 
increase in warheads being carried on each SSBN, the Soviets could dedicate a 
higher percentage of warheads to SAC bomber bases than previously and barrage 
aircraft egress routes. The act of escape under reduced tactical warning becomes 
extremely diff icul t. Nonetheless, destroying the 30 percent of bombers and 
tankers on day to day alert may be a dif f icul t. Supported by ear ly warning 
systems these aircraft are said to have a reaction time from SLBM breakwater to 
bomber brake release of six and one half minutes: one and one half minutes for 
the US early warning system to sound the alarm at SAC bases, and five minutes for 
SAC crews to move to their aircraft, start them and roll to takeoff position . 12 
If the B1-Bs, B-2s and KC-135R (tankers) can fly out at five miles per minute , 
the six minute leeway between takeoff and SLBM warhead arrival (in the worst 
case) would allow the aircraft to be nearly 30 miles away. If blast overpressure 
of two pounds per square inch for KC-135R and four pounds per square inch for 
B-1Bs and B-2s will disable the aircraft, the lethal radius of a 100 kiloton 
9. See Michael E. Brown, "The US Manned Bomber and Strategic Deterrence in the 1990s," International Security, 
vol.14, no.2 (Fall 1989): p.9. 
10. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 1974-1975, (London 1974) , pp .8, 
73; and The Military Balance 1988-1989, (London 1988): pp.33, 230. 
11. Brown, "The US Manned Bomber," p.21. 
12. See Alton H. Ouanbeck and Archie L. Wood, Modernizing The Strategic Bomber Force Why and How , (Washington , 
D.C., 1976), pp.23-24, 46-47 . 
8 
warhead will be four and one half miles for KC-135R and two and one half miles 
for B-1Bs and B-2s. For a 500 kiloton warhead the lethal radius is six and one 
half miles for KC-135R and four miles for B-1Bs and B-2s. 13 These figures look 
promising for the bombers if one or two warheads only are taken into account. 
However, two Soviet SS-N-20 SLBMs can carry 20 warheads, and therefore a barrage 
of airspace around a particular SAC bomber base would be feasible and extremely 
effective. 
Estimates of just how much retaliatory capacity the bomber force could muster 
following a surprise attack are relatively low. 
suggest that the bomber force could deliver nearly 
achieve this figure a minimum force of 95 B-52H, 
supporting tankers would need to survive a surprise 
would need to be carrying a maximum load of 20, 
respectively to achieve this figure. 14 With this 
generally accepted figure is that bombers could 
The most generous estimates 
5,000 warheads to target. To 
97 B-1B, 75 B-2 bombers and 
attack. Moreover, each bomber 
16 and 16 nuc lear weapons 
scenar io unl ikely, a more 
deliver approximately 1000 
warheads to target. Realistically, this would require a force of no less than a 
100 bombers, which were not maximum loaded, and supporting tankers. In the 1990s , 
however, there will be a progressive decline in the total number of bombers and 
therefore a corresponding decline in deliverable warheads and survival rates. 
At this stage, many observers of the bomber debate may draw the conclusion that 
bombers are rapidly becoming an irrelevant leg of the nuclear triad. While this 
is not an unreasonable conclusion, most of the aforementioned calculations are 
based on qualitative and quantitative improvements to Soviet SSBN and SLBM that 
are yet to be made. Indeed, such a surprise attack remains contingent not only on 
these improvements, but also on a major rupture in US-Soviet relations. This is 
not to say, however, that such an event could never happen. The US would be 
fool-hardy not to give some credence to the unlikely. The dramatic changes in 
recent years will not necessarily slow Soviet force modernisation and capability. 
The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), while imposing quantitative 
restrictions will probably fuel qualitative improvements. 
On a specific note, SAC bombers and tankers will remain totally dependent on 
adequate warning in the forseeable future, and minimising the impact of expected 
SSBN and SLBM improvements will be problematic. Redeploying SAC bombers and 
tankers inland has occurred but there are geographical and cost limitations . 
Expanding alert rates15 from 30 percent to 50 percent could create runway queuing 
13 . See Brown, liThe US Manned Bomber," footnote 48, p.23 and Quanbeck and Wood, Modernizing The Strategic 
Bomber Force, pp.48-50. 
14. Given the demands of the penetration mission which would require a bomber to make trade-offs between 
electronic countermeasures, defence suppression, nuclear and conventional ordinance, it is unlikely that an 
aircraft would be carrying its maximum load of nuclear ordnance. Although stand-off , 
cruise-missi le-carrying bombers would operate in a less demanding envi ronment, a simi lar situation wou ld 
apply. According to one analyst 10 weapons per aircraft would be quite realistic. See Brown , liThe US Manned 
Bomber," pp.24-25. 
15. On 27 September 1991, President Bush announced that all US strategic nuclear bombers would be removed from 
day to day alert status and their weapons downloaded to storage areas. "Statement to the Nation , " President 
George Bush, text reprinted in Reuters, 27 September 1991. 
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problems, while having more aircraft on airborne alert increases accident 
potential and reduces life of type. Improving aircraft performance for faster 
take-offs and climb rates is also not feasible considering the present status of 
the B-1B and B-2 programmes. Ballistic missile defences around SAC bases make 
little sense as only one is permitted under the amendment to the 1974 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.16 Moreover, SAC bomber bases are soft targets and 
limited defences would be easily saturated. Limiting the accuracy of SLBMs would 
be opposed by the Soviet Union as the US Trident II D-5 SLBM is already a fait 
accompli. Similarly, limits on SLBM and SSBN loadings, would be opposed due to 
the effects on retaliatory capability. Finally, and perhaps the most promising 
approach, is prohibition of depressed trajectory SLBMs. 17 Bomber vulnerability 
per se would not be solved, but tactical warning would not be decreased adding a 
stabilising influence to the overall situation. 
Justifying the Manned Bomber 
If the problems concerning pre-launch survivability of the manned bomber seem 
insurmountable in the face of a surprise attack, this does not necessarily mean 
there can be no justification at all. In fact there remain several arguments in 
favour of the manned bomber. 
The first is that the manned bomber enhances the survivability of silo-based 
ICBMs and vice versa. As the Scowcroft Commission pointed out, it is inherently 
difficult to attack silo-based ICBMs and bomber bases simultaneously. Should the 
Soviet Union launch its ICBMs and SLBMs at the same time, the latter would arrive 
some 15-20 minutes before the ICBMs reach US missile silos. While many non-alert 
bombers may be caught on the ground, the US could still launch its ICBMs under 
attack. Similarly, if the Soviet Union arranges to have its ICBMs and SLBMs reach 
their targets at the same time, the US would still have 30 minutes tactical 
warning of impending attack, enabling the bombers to scramble out of their 
bases. 18 In essence, ICBMs and bombers "work together in a synergistic 
relationship to ensure that at least one land-based leg of the triad survives 
even a carefully planned surprise attack".19 
As discussed above, however, this may not continue to hold true should the 
Soviet Union develop its SSBN/SLBM forces to the extent that they can 
significantly cover a declining US land-based target set. The US is then left in 
the exposed position of entrusting its entire survivable retaliatory capacity to 
submarines. A sudden technological breakthrough in anti-submarine warfare 
16. A defensive ring would only protect one base and perhaps a dozen aircraft. Furthermore, defensive 
deployments are generally cost-prohibitive - perhaps $8-10 billion to save 12 aircraft. See Brown , p.29. 
17. See Walter Slocombe, "Danger: Low-Flying Missiles," Washington Post, 13 May 1988, p.23; and Quanbeck and 
Wood, Modernizing The Strategic Bomber Force, p.44. 
18. Report of the Presidents Commission, pp.7-8. 
19. Brown, liThe US Manned Bomber," p.9. 
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(although unlikely in the immediate future)20 could render SSBNs vulnerable. 
Moreover, SSBN are imperfect retaliatory tools suffering from c3 problems which 
could prevent them receiving prompt launch instructions. 21 They are also unable 
to launch a portion of their missiles without betraying their location, and under 
START it is possible that fewer US SSBN will be deployed - perhaps 16 to 20, of 
which only 10 or 12 would be on station at any given time. 22 
A possible solution to this dilemma may have been to make US ICBMs mobile. The 
now cancelled road-mobile Midgetman offered one of the best chances of survival 
for land-based ICBMs. Simply put, when considering the land area such missiles 
could disperse into, the Soviets would have had a very difficult task conduct i ng 
a barrage attack of known basing locations. But this development, while limiting 
ICBM vulnerability, added little to the synergistic relationship. If mobile 
Midgetman could ostensibly withstand a surprise attack in its own right, then 
bombers could have contributed little to its survivability. Conversely, 
deployment of Midgetman would not have assisted bomber survivability as the 
Soviet Union would have been unlikely to expend valuable SLBM warheads on futile 
barrages of Midgetman basing areas while allowing US bomber bases to remain 
unscathed. 23 
A second argument is that the present vulnerability of silo-based ICBMs, along 
with the accuracy and yield limitations of SLBMs, makes the manned bomber the 
most capable method of conducting large-scale retaliatory attacks against 
hard-targets. 24 Should the US find itself in a situation of being unable to 
significantly threaten Soviet hard-targets in a retaliatory strike, the country 
would therefore be vulnerable to nuclear blackmail. 25 In this case, bombers would 
certainly playa major part in the strategic force structure. 
This bomber advantage may, however, be mitigated by technology. Development of 
the accurate Trident II D-5 SLBM gives the submarine leg an independent, 
survivable, hard-target capability.26 The upshot of this may be more hard-target 
20. For a useful discussion on the problems of hunting modern submarines and possible technological solutions , 
see Mike Witt, "Subhunting Technology - Process i ng Progress , " Asian Defence Journal, (December 1991): 
pp.66-74. 
21. The main criticism of SSBN c3 concerns the speed and suvivabi l ity under nuclear attack of the US Navy's 
shore-based global very-low-frequency (VLF) network, extra-low-frequency (ELF) transmitters and "Take Cha rge 
and Move Out" (TACAMO) VLF relay aircraft. For contrasting views on cOllTTlunication l inks to SSBN see Rear 
Admiral W.J. Holland USN (Rtd.), liThe Link to the Boomers:The Triads Best!," United States Naval Inst i tute 
Proceedings, Vol.114, No.1 (January 1988): pp.48-49; and Richard B. Kelly, liThe Link to the Boomers :A Bad 
Connection," Ibid, pp.48. 
22. For an in-depth assessment of the effects of a START treaty on US submarine forces see Desmond Ball, Some 
Implications of Fifty Per Cent Reductions In Strategic Nuclear Forces For Sea-Based Systems, a paper 
prepared for the 52nd Pugwash Symposium on Naval Forces: Arms Restraint and Confidence Bui lding , (Oslo , 
23 -26 June 1988): pp.1-18; and Robert McFarlane, "Effective Strategic Policy , " Foreign Affairs, vol.67, no. 1 
(Fall 1988): pp.41-42. 
23. See Brown, liThe US Manned Bomber,lI p.12. 
24. It is likely these hard targets would primarily be hardened C3I assets. 
25. See Paul H. Nitze, "Deterring Our Deterrent," Foreign Policy, no.25 (Winter 1976/1977): pp.95-210. 
26. For a discussion of the advantages of Trident II D-5 compared to ICBM and manned bombers see Owen Cote, liThe 
Trident and the Triad:Collecting the D-5 Dividend," International Security, Vol.16, No.2 (Fall 1991): 
pp.117-145. 
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warheads carried on ballistic missiles, fewer targets assigned to high yield 
gravity bombs and a corresponding decline in the bomber's contribution to 
coverage of the hard-target set. 27 
One of the least contestable arguments in favour of manned bombers is their 
recallability after launch. The bomber's ability to flush from their bases during 
periods of tension, their slow time-to-target (six to 12 hours over the Soviet 
Union)28 and low alert rate, enables the bomber to be eschewed as a first-strike 
system which in turn enhances strateg ic stability. While these points have 
validity, the fact remains that bombers are dependent upon adequate warning time 
for survival. The same does not apply to the SSBN fleet on station or a mobile 
missile force. 
A fourth argument is that manned bombers complicate Soviet air defence efforts. 
Illustrative of this is a statement by General Chain: 
A mix of stand-off and penetrating bombers spreads Soviet 
defenses very thin by forcing them to protect the far forward 
approaches to the Soviet Union as well as maintain extensive 
internal air defenses that would try to prevent our 
t l ' t' 29 re a ~a ~on. 
By deploying two kinds of air-breathing systems the Soviet Union is prevented 
from concentrating all its air defence efforts on a single threat. This argument 
has been a major rallying point for defenders of the penetrating bomber in 
particular. As put by retired USAF Chief of Staff, General Larry Welch: 
If you lose the penetrating bomber then over time you lose 
your cruise missile carriers [because the Soviets can 
concentrate on defeating them] ... When you allow one leg to 
atrophy you solve one-third of the Soviets [defense] 
problems. 30 
There is also an economic aspect to this defence of the penetrating bomber. 
According to Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman , Sam Nunn: 
27. See Brown, liThe US Manned Bomber," p.13. 
28. Schneider, "Dyad or Triad," p.31. 
29. US Congress, Senate, Senator Exon requesting that GeneraL Chain's Letter concerning the B-2 bomber be 
pubLished in the CongressionaL Record. 101st Congress, 1st sess, 9 May 1989. CongressionaL Record, voL.135, 
no.57, p.54964. 
30. Quoted in Peter ALmond, "House Corrrnittee Finds SteaLth in its Gun Sights," Washington Times, 13 JuLy 1989, 
p.3. 
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the Soviets have something like $400 billion in air 
defenses. The Stealth Bomber is going to require them to 
either give up on those air defenses in large or they're 
going to have to revamp them. So there's a huge economic 
premium here for the Stealth Bomber3l 
Although the B-2 threat to Soviet air defences will be discussed in greater 
detail later, there is currently no evidence to suggest the Soviet Union will 
greatly increase its spending in this area in order to counter a yet to be proven 
penetration system. Defence against cruise missiles, especially the AGM-129A 
advanced cruise missile, may well prove impossible, leading the Soviets to 
conclude that increased spending is a pointless exercise. Penetrating bombers may 
help complicate the Soviet air defence problem through diversifying the threat, 
but they do not necessarily appear more adept at overcoming air defences than 
cruise missiles. Moreover, even without penetrating bombers, combating the threat 
posed solely by cruise missiles remains difficult. 
In terms of the issues addressed above, the case for manned bombers appears 
weak. A declining synergistic relationship between ICBMs and bombers caused by 
deployment of more survivable systems would not be altered by the B-2. While the 
B-2 has a capacity to carry up to 16 nuclear weapons (less for long-range 
war-time strikes) for hard-target capability, this would not alter the trend 
towards basing more hard-target warheads on ballistic-missile systems such as 
Trident II D-S. As with all bombers, the B-2 is recallable and reusable, but as 
for the aircraft not posing a first-strike threat, the point remains moot. 
Pre-launch survivability and the linkage with warning time also remain unchanged. 
In terms of complicating Soviet air defences supporters of the B-2 have accorded 
it a dubious special status. Nonetheless, two key advantages accredited to the 
B-2 bomber remain. These are the ability to hold at risk Soviet strategic 
relocatable targets and conventional roles. The former was intrinsic to 
development of the B-2 while the latter now assumes considerable importance in 
the B-2's case for deployment. 




THE B-2 PROGRAMME 
special features 
On 22 August 1980, President Carter's Defense Secretary, Harold Brown, 
disclosed that research on a highly survivable, strategic penetration bomber, 
with even lower observable characteristics than the B-IB would be developed. l 
President Reagan confirmed in October 1981 a requirement for 132 aircraft of 
which 120 would be nuclear-capable. After these revelations a veil of secrecy 
descended over the B-2 programme until 19 November 1987 when Northrop Aircraft 
Division was awarded a $2 billion contract for production of the B-2. Major 
sub-contractors to the programme would be Boeing Advanced Systems, LTV Aircraft 
Products Group, General Electric Aircraft Engine Group, Hughes Radar Systems 
Group and the Link Flight Simulation Group. Initial operating capability was set 
for the early 1990s. 
Official information regarding the aircraft's 
cost was non-existant in the public domain, 
predicting the basic design would be of the 
design, technology, materials and 
but informed commentators were 
flying wing concept. 2 They were 
proved correct on 20 April 1988 when the USAF released an artist's impression of 
the B-2, although several details had been obscured for security reasons. One of 
the most important milestones in the B-2 programme was reached on 22 November 
1988 when the aircraft was towed from its hangar at Palmdale, California and 
presented to the public. At this juncture a considerable amount of information 
concerning the B-2's characteristics quickly became declassified. 3 
Perhaps the most remarkable features of the aircraft are its use of "stealth" 
technologies especially in the aerodynamics, avionics and materials. The B-2's 
all-wing shape was intended to reduce its radar cross-section4 and infra-red 
signature making it less visible to air defence sensors. This was achieved by 
eliminating highly radar-reflective flat surfaces and angular joints, and by 
burying of the engines in the fuselage with the exhausts extensively masked and 
mixed with cool air to reduce their temperature. Although the B-2's avionics 
suite remains classified the aircraft is expected to have a very sophisticated 
offensive avionics system including forward-looking infra-red, terrain-following 
1. The project was known officiaLLy as "Senior CJ." 
2. Northrop's experience with such a concept dates back to 1928 when designer Jack Northrop Left Lockheed to 
pursue the idea of a flying wing privateLy. His endeavours produced the N-IM in 1939, the piston-engined 
XB-35 in 1946 and the jet-engined YB-49 in 1947. Neither the XB-35 or YB-49 reached significant production 
capabiLity and when the Latter crashed in 1949 kiLLing the piLot, the programme died aLso. 
3. The aircraft's key statistics [incLuding dimensions, weights, armament and range] are Listed in Appendix 1. 
4. The radar cross-section of a B-2 is estimated to be 0.01 square metres (approximateLy the size of a smaLL 
bird) compared to 60 square metres for the B-52. See John W.R. LepingweLL, "Soviet Strategic Air Defense and 
the SteaLth ChaLLenge," InternationaL Security, voL. 14, no.2 (FaLL 1989): pp. 84-86; and BiLL Sweetman, 
"Bomber forces mission and equipment," InternationaL Defense Review, voL.22 (August 1989): p.1040. 
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and terrain-avoidance radars. Some aviation writers have speculated that the B-2 
will utilise low-probability of intercept radar technology such as the use of 
very low side-lobe antennas and constant variations in frequency and waveform. 5 
Defensive avionics, such as radar and communications jammers, chaff, flare and 
decoy dispensers, are unlikely to be carried owing to the aircraft's 
low-observable characteristics. 6 Much secrecy also surrounds the nature of the 
materials from which the B-2 is constructed, but experts believe the B-2' s 
structure relies heavily upon graphite/epoxy (carbonfibre) and other advanced 
composites, with extensive use of honeycomb radar-absorbant structure, and 
radar-absorbant material skinning. 7 
The B-2 also breaks new ground in the way it is designed and built . Extensive 
use has been made of computer-aided design and manufacturing. This has allowed 
each aircraft to be constructed on production standard tooling, or in final as 
opposed to prototype configuration. Final assembly is conducted at Palmdale with 
flight-testing conducted at Edwards Air Force Base, also in California. In terms 
of both individual sub-systems and the total aircraft, the B-2 is probably the 
most extensively pre-flight tested aircraft ever. Over seven years, a total of 
740,000 hours of pre-flight tests were completed8 enabling Northrop and the USAF 
to claim that technological risks in the B-2 programme had been minimised. The 
maiden flight of the B-2 on 17 July 1989 vindicated this faith and by 1 May this 
year the first four aircraft had logged 544 hours on 125 flights operating over 
the full operational speed range and conducting aerial refuelling behind both 
KC10 and KC135 Tanker aircraft. Overall, 3600 hours of planned light-testing are 
scheduled during the full-scale development phase. 9 
The radar signature or "low-observable" testing phase is critical to the B-2's 
operational prospects. If results are not up to expectation and the B-2 proves 
less stealthy than claimed, there is every likelihood Congress will block further 
funding for the B-2 programme. To facilitate low-observable testing, the USAF has 
added on extensive electronic warfare capability to its Utah test and training 
range. The goal of the electronic combat test capability programme is to provide 
5. See Bill Sweetman, "B-2 Bomber for the 21st Century," Interavia, vol. 44 (January 1989):p.25. 
6. Michael Brown, "B-2 or not B-2: Crisis and Choice in the US Strategic Bomber ProgralTJlle," Survival, vol . xxx , 
no.4 (July/August 1988): p.356. 
7. See Marvin Leibstone, "Stealth: The US Advanced Technology Bomber," Military Technology, vol . x (September 
1986): pp. 219-224. 
8. This testing phase comprised: 24,000 hours of wind tunnel testing; 6,000 hours of manned operations by USAF 
and Northrop pilots in advanced flight and mission simulators; 16,000 hours of engineering development 
testing for refinement and evaluation of flight controls, cockpit avionics and human factors; nearly 42,000 
hours of rel iabi l ity testing; 67,000 hours in acceptance testing; 122,000 hours testing computer - related 
systems; 291,000 hours of flight qualification testing; two aircraft lifetimes of durability testing; and 
full production qualification of the B-2 1 s engines. "B-2 ATB-A Revolution In Deterrence , " Northrop Publicity 
Brochure, 22 November 1988 . 
9. B-2 test crews have flown the aircraft in 95% of its operational flight envelope and from sea leve l to 
"almost 50,000 feet". About 30% of planned flying qual ities and fl ight control testing, 80% of the aerial 
refuelling envelope and more than 50% of the planned vibro-acoustics testing with weapons bay doors open are 
completed. Testing of the B-2s ability to complete take-off and landing and refuelling at night cOlTJllenced in 
May. See ~illiam B. Scott, "B-2 Test Program Remains on Track to Meet Aero-Structural Milestones," Aviation 
~eek and Space Technology, 18 November 1991, pp.63-64; and Barbara Opall, "U.S. Air Force to In i tiate 
Nighttime B-2 Test Flights," Defense News, 25-31 May 1992, p.8. 
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layers of threats over a 70 nautical mile corridor containing up to 100 
electronic warfare threats which lead to target areas. Aircraft would drop down 
to levels as low as 100 feet above ground level and attempt to penetrate the 
corridor at high sub-sonic speeds. 10 
Another major feature of the full-scale development programme has been the 
focus on logistic support. To ensure increased reliability, maintainability and 
supportability, the B-2 programme has emphasised early involvement of maintenance 
personnel in the design and test phases. This approach should ensure that when 
the first B-2 is delivered to ACC, a cadre of qualified maintenance personnel 
will have the technical data, spares and support equipment necessary to generate 
sorties. As noted by B-2 programme director, Major General Richard Scofield: 
This was one of the lessons learned on the B-1B program -
have a maintenance capability in place when aircraft arrive 
at the first base. We're not doing this program just to get 
the first airplane out the door. We're doing it to provide a 
useful capability that can be [employed] the way SAC wants 
from the time they get [the B_2].11 
The first operational site for the B-2 is Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri , 
where specialised maintenance docks and hangars are being constructed. 
Problems 
Although there are many positive factors in the B-2 procurement programme, 
Defense Secretary Cheney probably understated the case when he said "we've got 
problems with the B_2.,,12 Extant in the programme are a number of potentially 
serious production, performance and management problems. 
Attracting the most cr iticism is the decision to make the B-2 a highly 
"concurrent" programme; that is, compress the traditional stages of the 
procurement process so that research, engineering development, prototype testing 
and production occur simultaneously. The USAF and Northrop argue that concurrency 
in the B-2 programme is less than that found in any major modern aircraft 
procurement by Defense. Moreover, by building all B-2s on production-standard 
tooling, considerable costs are saved by not building preliminary tooling for 
just a few prototypes. While this plan looked solid in theory, it has proved a 
false economy in one key instance. 
10. The first B-2 (AV-1) has now been dedicated to this phase and about one year of low observables testing is 
completed. The Director of the B-2 combined Test Force, Colonel Frank Birk, has said the test force has 
"looked at the entire radar spectrum, from low to high frequencies, focusing on those frequencies that 
represent potential threats." Ibid, p.64. For details of the testing range see "Planned Air Force 
Electronic Warfare Range Would Be Used to Test B-2 , ATF," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 11 September 
1989, p.59. 
11. Cited in William B. Scott, "Success of B-2 Prograllllle Linked to Decision to Build, Deploy B-1B , 1I Aviation 
Week and Space Technology, 5 February 1990, p.73. 
12. Quoted in Defense Week, 26 June 1989, p.? 
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In 1983 SAC assessed that the B-2 would have to fly at very low altitudes, 
similar to the B-1B, as well as mid-to-high level altitudes. This requirement for 
an all-altitude capability required Northrop to undertake a massive effort to 
redesign the B-2's wings in order to cope with the greater aerodynamic stresses 
experienced at lower altitudes. Accordingly the production tooling which was 
already in place had to be redesigned. 13 The end result was a $1 billion increase 
in programme cost and an 18 month delay in the projected first flight date. 
Northrop itself was said to have written off some $214 million. 14 Although the 
first three B-2s are now flying, there is no concrete guarantee that a major 
design or structural fault may not arise requiring rectification and hence costly 
changes to production tooling. 1S This issue is of particular concern to Congress 
which has responded by linking programme funding to an ongoing and thorough test 
programme. 
A report issued by the General Accounting Office (GAO)16 on 22 February 1990, 
drew attention to several manufacturing problems, including defects and 
ineff icient labour, being encountered by the programme contractors. Despite 
corrective measures, the report found that "quality in the manufacturing process 
has not improved" and the rate of worker defects is higher on later models than 
on the first two aircraft. 17 Lax quality control also received attention from the 
Pentagon's outgoing Undersecretary for Acquisitions, Robert Costello, who said in 
an interview that Northrop's quality controls on the development of the planes 
are "terrible" and improved little between official visits to the Palmdale Plant 
over 18 months. 18 Costello said he observed nicks in composite structures and 
other defects which he subsequently reported to then Defense Secretary Frank 
Carlucci. When asked later by Carlucci why he kept "trying to kill the B-2", 
Costello apparently replied, "because Mr Secretary, it's being brought to you by 
the same company that brought you [a series of troubled programmes including 
guidance systems for the Peacekeeper and ALCM] ... what makes you think they'll 
do better [with the B_2].,,19 
13. See Ralph Vartabedian, "Redesign of Stealth Wing Caused Long Delay, Higher Cost," Los Angeles Times, 29 
October 1988, Part IV, p.1, 4. 
14. Michael Brown, "B-2 or not B-2," p.360. 
15. On 26 July 1991 (acknowledged by the USAF in September 1991), AV-1 experienced what was described as a minor 
stealth testing anomaly. By obtaining a less than expected radar cross-section reduction the possibility was 
raised that the B-2 might require changes in configuration. Air Force Secretary Donald Rice was adamant , 
however, that the shortcoming may only require small scale design changes involving no more than edges, 
surfaces and treatments along the leading edge of the wing. lilt does not go to the structure, shape or plan 
form of the airplane" and "in no sense does anyone see any prospect of any requirement for significant 
design changes II Rice said. Cited in David F. Bond, "USAF Resists Change in B-2 Configuration," Avation Week 
and Space Technology, 4 November 1991, p.69. See also Barbara Opall, "Pentagon Downplays Fai lure i n B-2 
Test," Defense News, 16 September 1991, p.22. 
16. The General Accounting Office is the investigating agency for Congress. 
17. The defects were caused mainly by improperly drilled holes and difficulties in sealing a fuel tank. The GAO 
reported that the first aircraft took 1.5 million work hours to build - 84 percent more than anticipated . 
Late last year engineers were making nearly 2,000 changes per month to engineering drawings adding extra 
disruption. See Molly Moore, "B-2 Costs Could Rise Sharply," Washington Post, 23 February 1990, p.1; and 
Rowan Scarborough,1I GAO drops $70 billion bomb on B-2 Stealth hearing," Washington Times, 23 February 1990, 
p.7. 
18. See Barbara Amouyal, "Air Force, OMB Eye Cuts in B-2 Bomber Purchases," Defense News, 22 May 1989, p.1. 
19. Cited in Molly Moore, "B-2 Bomber Cancellation Is Urged," Washington Post, 19 May 1989, p. 1. 
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A major performance-related problem appeared publicly in October 1989 when 
reports circulated in Congress indicated that the B-2 had less unrefueled 
cruising range than the B-1B. The documents reported that the B-2's advertised 
unrefueled range of 6000 nautical miles compared badly against the B-1B's range 
of 6400 nautical miles. With House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin 
describing this revelation as "not good news for the plane",20 the USAF countered 
firstly by charging that the reports were using outdated information and 
secondly, by releasing detailed performance figures which claimed the B-2 would 
in fact be capable of flying 6600 nautical miles and of 50 percent better fuel 
efficiency than the B-1B for unrefueled profiles. Furthermore, the USAF figures 
indicate that the B-2 required less than half the aerial refuelling support of 
the B-1B for nuclear strike missions against the Soviet union. 21 In terms of 
weapon load, however, only loads of 24,000 and 37,300 pounds were included in the 
analysis. The USAF has consistently been claiming a payload capability of 50,000 
pounds. 
On a similar note, the aforementioned GAO report noted that the bomber's 
projected weight (critical to range and weapon payload) had grown by several 
thousand pounds. Efforts to lighten the aircraft produced the opposite effect 
with further weight being added. In a classified supplement to the report, the 
GAO is reported to have warned that if the weight problem is not solved, the B-2 
may have less range and require longer take-offs. 22 
Compounding the impression of poor quality control and management is a $20 
billion false-claims lawsuit filed against Northrop by former employees . 23 The 
suit maintains that there was: 
widespread and long-term mismanagement, fraud and abuse 
within the stealth bomber program that resulted in 
mischarging, false statements and misrepresentation to the 
USAF concerning progress on the B-2 All of the money 
acquired by Northrop was fraudulently received because the 
company misled its USAF customer. 24 
20. Cited in George C. Wilson, "B-2 Stealth Bomber Has Shorter Cruising Range Than Older , Cheaper B-1 , " 
Washington Post, 6 October 1989, p.14. 
21. See David F. Bond, "USAF Say's B-2 Range Exceeds B-1B's With Varied Payloads, Fl ight Profi les," Aviation 
Week and Space Technology, 23 October 1989, pp.30-31. 
22. As part of the B-2 development process, a number of weight-saving changes in the aircraft wiring will be 
incorporated on AV-12, the sixth production aircraft, and subsequent aircraft. The planned changes , 
including the elimination of junction boxes and the use of lighter, thinner insulation, are expected to 
reduce aircraft weight by about 300 pounds. William B. Scott, "Structural Cracking Detected in B-2 Ground 
Test Article," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 13 May 1991, p.60. See also Moore, "B-2 Costs Could Rise 
Sharply,1I p.1; and Scarborough, "GAO drops $70 billion bomb," p.? 
23. The suit was originally filed in 1988, but after Northrop and federal government officials investigated the 
allegations for eight months, they determined there was insufficient evidence on which to intervene at that 
time. Undeterred, the complainants filed an expanded claim in the Los Angeles District Court on 2 October 
1989. 
24. Bruce A. Smith, "Suit Claims Northrop Wrongfully Took $20 Billion for Stealth Bomber Work," Aviation Week 
and Space Technology, 13 November 1989, p.26. 
18 
Specific allegations include poor design of critical electronic systems, 
installation of systems known to be faulty, false certification of equipment and 
maintenance of unnecessarily high work-force levels. These allegations are still 
subj ect to ongoing investigation and substantiation. On 15 February 1990 
Northrop's problems were increased when Federal Bureau of Investigation agents 
searched the company's Pico Rivera Plant (where B-2 parts are made) and took 
possession of several documents. According to one source: 





investigation without some sort of 
other event in the case. You can 
major 
always 
subpoena records. You don't conduct a raid unless you are 
worried the documents won't be there when you want them. 25 
The numerous allegations and investigations have not been encouraging for the 
programme, particularly in a time of increasing budgetary scrutiny. 
As noted earlier, a critical element in the B-2 test programme is the low 
observables phase. Ever since the B-2 programme was officially acknowledged to 
exist, the aircraft's proponents have continually extolled the virtues of its 
(anticipated) ability to avoid detection. In 1987, then Defense Secretary, 
Casper Weinberger, stated that to cope with the B-2 the: 
Soviets will be forced to make an enormous investment in new 
defense systems over a span of many years, while their 
existing enormous investment becomes rapidly obsolete. The 
[B-2] will not only dramatically degrade existing Soviet air 
defense, but those of Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies and Third 
World client states. 26 
No less emphatic was Lieutenant General Randolph when he claimed "the B-2 will 
render useless some $200 billion the Soviets have invested in spectacular air 
defenses".27 Similarly, Defense Secretary Cheney argued, the B-2: 
is virtually invisible to all known radar defenses and 
certainly [to] those that the Soviet Union has invested in 
past years It will have the capacity to penetrate Soviet 
airspace, even if they make significant additional 
investments in their defenses for a long time to come. 28 
25. Cited in Ralph Vartabedian, "FBI Agents Raid Northropls B-2 Bomber Plant," Los Angeles Times, 22 February 
1990, p.D2. 
26. Cited in Doug Richardson, "ls Stealth misleading?," Interavia Aerospace Review (October 1989): p.969 . 
27. Randolph, liThe B-2 Bomber Technology In Transition," p.495. 
28. Cited in Mark Thompson, "B-2 I s touted Stealth in dispute," Philadelphia Inquirer, 30 July 1989, p.2D. 
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Given the relative infancy of the B-2 low-observables testing programme at the 
time these remarks were extremely optimistic. Not surprisingly, the scientific 
and defence industrial community quickly accepted the opportunity to propose a 
wide range of prospective counter-stealth technologies, including 
over-the-horizon-backscatter, long-wave-length, bistatic and ultra-wide-band 
radar and airborne warning and control systems, which were thought to be capable 
of detecting the B-2. The B-2s large planform, jet plume and choice of sensors 
were also identified as potential aids in the detection process. 29 
In September 1989 Air Force Secretary Rice signalled the USAF move away from 
claims that the B-2 was virtually radar invisible when he conceded that "systems 
and techniques exist which can detect it. ,,30 At the same time, however, the 
counter-stealth debate was put into perspective when it was pointed out that 
vunerability assessments must look past yes-or-no detectability and ask whether a 
prospective counter-stealth system can: 
Detect the B-2 at all altitudes and flight profiles with suitable 
coverage to defend a large area. 
Track the B-2 accurately enough and long enough to direct a weapons 
system against it. 
Guide a weapon and fuze it so that its warhead will explode close to 
the aircraft. 31 
On the strength of analyses by a stealth technology "Red Team" 32 of how 
effective existing Soviet air defences would be against the B-2, the USAF was 
confident that no "Archilles heel" had been found which would negate the value of 
stealth technology for the forseeable future. For existing defences the team 
found that: 
29. For detailed evaluation of radar technologies supposedly able to detect the B-2, see: Lepingwell, "Soviet 
Strategic Air Defenses," pp.83-86; Brower, "Targeting Mobile Nuclear Forces," pp.24-31, 33-35; Richardson, 
"ls Stealth Misleading," pp.968-970; loJilliam B. Scott, "UloJB Radar Has Potential To Detect Stealth Aircraft," 
Aviation loJeek and Space Technology, 4 December 1989, pp.38-41; Jack Anderson and Dale van Atta, "Soviet 
Radar Might See Stealth Planes," loJashington Post, 10 February 1986, p.B-14; "Stealth Aircraft Spur Interest 
in Space Sensors," Aviation loJeek and Space Technology, 14 April 1986, p.67; "Defeating Stealth,lI 
International Defense Review, vol. 22 (August 1989): p.1103; and David F. Bond, "USAF Believes Impulse 
Radar Not Feasible For Detecting B-2," Aviation loJeek and Space Technology, 26 February 1990, p.53. 
30. Cited in Mark Thompson, "Foe will be able to detect Stealth Air Force says," Baltimore Sun, 2 November 1989, 
p.1. 
31. See David F. Bond, "USAF Study Asserts That Soviet Defenses loJould Be Ineffective Against B-2 Bomber," 
Aviation loJeek and Space Technology, 30 October 1989, pp.29-30. 
32. Established by the USAF in 1981, this team has evaluated more than 40 unconventional stealth concepts 
including acoustic systems; ground-based and airborne bistatics; anti-stealth radar waveforms; balloon 
radar; bistatic reflectors; detection of corona; correlation spectroscopy; cosmic rays; differential 
absorption, infrared airborne warning and control system; infra-red search and track; land mines; magnetic 
disturbance; space-based radars, upgrading existing systems; over-the-horizon radar; passive coherent 
detection; radar shadow detection; hybrid bistatic radar; detection of aircraft emissions; impulse radars; 
towers and nets; advanced airborne surveillance; radar wake detection; radiometres; ultra-write band radar; 
polysaturation doppler; and high frequency radars. Ibid, p.29. 
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the B-2 can penetrate without allowing adequate vectoring of Soviet 
fighters; 
fighter sensors cannot detect the B-2 at large enough distances to 
engage and provide a suitable defence; and 
SAM envelopes have been dramatically reduced so that mission planning 
and reactive avoidance works under most conditions. 33 
In May 1991 initial results from the low observables testing on the first B-2 
(AV-1) indicated that the aircraft's radar cross-section would enable it to 
penetrate and survive sophisticated air defences with a high degree of 
reliability.34 Six months later, however, the USAF's confidence in the B-2s low 
observability suffered a setback when it was revealed AV-1 had failed to meet 
desired radar signature measurements. Due to the highly classified nature of this 
phase of testing, the USAF would only describe the failure as the B-2 "attaining 
a less than expected radar cross-section at a particular frequency." 
Senior Air Force and Defense Department officials admitted the problem was 
cause for concern but highlighted the fact that the failure had occurred in only 
one area of a comprehensive low observables testing programme. According to Air 
Force Secretary Rice the test fell short of predictions partly because the test 
aircraft was not in precisely the configuration for which the stealth predictions 
were calculated. 35 
In an effort to downplay the significance of the problem the USAF ruled out any 
possibility of costly structural or design changes to the B-2. As an alternative 
it was revealed that relaxation of radar cross-section requirements were being 
considered. Supported by the Defense Science Board (DSB) B-2 Task Force36 the 
USAF began research into how much radar cross-section the B-2 would actually need 
especially for missions to deliver conventional rather than nuclear weapons. 
According to DSB Chairman John Foster, the review "will be invaluable in allowing 
improved tradeoffs to be conducted against signature requirements.,,37 In addition 
to reviewing stealth requirements the USAF is studying ways to compensate for the 
test anomaly, if necessary, by changing its plans for operating the B-2. As put 
33. Ibid, p.30. 
34. The GAO reported that these initial tests measured the radar signature from throughout 360 degrees and at 
angles above and below the aircraft. Researchers also illuminated surfaces that are normally exposed to 
ground-based radar. It was noted, however, that only four percent of the test programme had been completed 
and that the B-2s full capabilities had not been tested in a representative operational environment. "GAO 
Says Initial Tests Confirm B-2s Ability To Evade Radar," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 6 May 1991. 
p.66. 
35. See David F.Bond, "USAF Resists Changes," p.69. 
36. Immediately following the test anomaly of 26 July a panel of stealth experts including the DSB was 
extablished to review the B-2s stealth requirements. Ibid. 
37. Ibid, p.70. 
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by USAF Chief of Staff, General Merrill McPeak, the USAF will be able to devise 
"operational workarounds" or "in other words we can stand off a little from 
suspect radars.,,38 
On 1 May the USAF effectively completed its withdrawal from claims the B-2 is 
potentially radar invisible. In testimony to the House Armed Services Procurement 
Subcommittee Tactical Air Commander, General Mike Loh, confirmed the bomber has 
not done as well as expected in stealth testing and is unlikely to meet all the 
technical specifications established to ensure the planes' ability to evade the 
full spectrum of radar frequencies. Nonetheless, Loh insisted that a combination 
of "fixes" now being tested by the USAF coupled with what he described as smart 
mission planning and tactics, will ensure that the B-2 meets its operational 
requirements: 
I'm fairly confident that we're going to find a solution [to 
stealth testing deficiencies] but that is not to say that the 
B-2 will meet its specifications at every frequency, at every 
angle and at every elevation ... and I don't believe it has to 
in order to be an operationally effective bomber in either 
the nuclear or conventional role. 39 
In explaining how the B-2 would meet its operational requirements despite the 
stealth deficiency Loh said: 
We'll fly the B-2 just like we fly other planes. We will do 
it smartly; we'll have smart tactics, smart mission planning 
and we're not going to put it in a situation where the 
probability of survival is not 100 percent. 40 
Queried by House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin about the 
difference in B-2 operational requirements for nuclear and conventional missions , 
Loh explained that the demands on the aircraft in non-nuclear roles are less 
severe because conventionally equipped B-2s can operate with other systems for 
maximum effectiveness: 
38. Ibid. 
The difference is that for the nuclear mission you'll have to 
take on those [early warning] radars without any support 
every time. In conventional missions, you're going to have 
other forces at your disposal. So if you have a deficiency in 
a specific frequency where radars operate, you can take out 
that radar by other means. 41 




While Congressional reaction to the B-2s stealth deficiency has been muted it 
has made funding for the final four aircraft conditional on Pentagon 
certification that the aircraft's stealth charateristics work as advertised. 
Moreover, the prospect of the B-2 not having the capability to evade radar 
independently, especially on nuclear missions, must be alarming given the mission 
requirements identified for the bomber. 
cost 
The debate over the cost of the B-2 programme is a particularly complex and at 
times confusing affair. For many years programme costs were hidden in what 
officials refer to as the "black" side of the defence budget and only became 
public during 1988 and 1989. Once costs became public, arguments soon developed 
between the USAF and members of Congress over how procurement costs should be 
expressed, particularly whether in terms of unit programme cost or flyaway cost. 
Arguments also broke out over the requirement for, and vast cost of, procuring 
the full 132 bomber fleet. Congress was convinced that the Pentagon was 
underestimating the changed strategic circumstances brought about by the quest 
for democracy in Eastern Europe and a Soviet Union increasingly preoccupied with 
internal difficulties. In response, Secretary Cheney announced in late April 1990 
that the intended purchase of B-2s would be cut from 132 to 75 aircraft and 
following the abortive August 1991 coup against President Gorbachev and 
subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union into the Commonwealth of Independent 
States, President Bush announced, early this year, that the programme would be 
capped at 20 aircraft. Notwithstanding these reductions, the B-2 remains an 
enormously expensive aircraft. 
The decision to keep the B-2's costs secret for so long attracted considerable 
criticism, but sharp disagreement had existed inside the Pentagon over whether 
the B-2 budget should be declassif ied. Former USAF Secretary, Vern Orr, 
recommended declassification in 1984 and 1985 but was blocked by Defense 
Secretary Weinberger. Orr felt that: 
It [the B-2] had become so big that it distorted the budget. 
Financially, it was becoming burdensome to hide that much 
money. And my feeling was that we were not being fair to 
congress. 42 
When figures did become available, it was apparent the B-2 programme had been 
troubled by cost-growth problems caused by a series of decisions to reschedule 
the "ramp-up" to peak production. During the mid-1980s an eighteen month delay 
was incurred as a result of the maj or wing redesign to the B-2. A further 
two-year delay was ordered in 1987 due to the Gramm-Rudman anti-deficit 
42. Cited in RaLph Vartabedian, "Why Did AF End SteaLth on SteaLth?," Los AngeLes Times , 2 August 1989, p.1. 
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provisions 43 and in 1989 Secretary Cheney's revised budget added a further 12 
month delay to the production phase. The combined result of these decisions was a 
revised completion time for the programme from 1995 to 1999 and an increase in 
overall costs. 
In dollar terms, the four-year delay to programme completion pushed the total 
programme cost up from $68.1 billion to $70.2 billion. By early April 1990, the 
USAF conceded that the price had risen another seven percent to $75.6 billion 
with each aircraft set to cost around $573 million. 44 Congressional reaction to 
the huge cost of the B-2 programme was predictably negative. 45The USAF defended 
the programme by insisting that the $573 million figure cited by Congress and the 
media was misleading. To date nearly $27 billion has already been spent or "sunk" 
on the full-scale development programme. According to the USAF, those funds are 
non-recurring and should not be applied when costing each aircraft. The correct 
measure is the "flyaway" cost which excludes research and development. When the 
flyaway cost is used, each B-2 was said to cost between $285 and $300 million 
under the 132 bomber plan. 46 
The realities of dramatic changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, along 
with an increasing Federal def ic it, conspired against this plan. The peak 
procurement years coincided with Secretary Cheney's request that each service 
submit budget-cutting plans to meet a $180 billion reduction in military spending 
during Fiscal Years 1992-94. The USAF was asked to reduce its budget by $9 
billion in 1992, $12 billion 1993 and $16 billion in 1994. While proposing to 
stretch out the B-2 programme, close installations and eliminate several air 
wings, the USAF still fell eight billion short of the $45 billion target . 47 
On 26 April 1990 and under increasing pressure, Cheney announced the results of 
a major aircraft review which reduced B-2 numbers to 75 aircraft or two strategic 
wings. Cheney's revised acquisition plan envisaged the purchase of two B-2s in 
43. Under the Gramm-Rudman deficit reduction law, the Federal budget automatically enters a sequestration 
process at the start of each f i sca l year (October 1) if Congress and the Wh i te House have not met 
pre-arranged deficit reduction goals. Sequestration triggers automatic spending cuts. Half of any deficit 
overrun would have to be absorbed by the Defense budget with the largest share coming from the procurement 
accounts. See "Pentagon Budget Expected to Lose About $3 Billion to Grarrrn-Rudman," Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, 22 November 1989, p.16; and Bruce A. Smith, "B-2 Peak Production Delays Drive Up Program Costs , " 
Aviation Week and Space Technology, 24 July 1989, p.26 . 
44. See Richard Halloran, "Air Force Raises Cost Estimate of Stealth Bombers to $68.1 Bi l lion," New York Times , 
24 June 1989, p.1; and Mark Thompson, "B-2's cost again rises by 7 percent," Philadelphia Inquirer, 3 Apr il 
1990, p. 7. 
45. Attracting the most criticism was Secretary Cheney's revised production plan which envisaged five B-2s be i ng 
built in 1991, 10 in 1992, 21 in 1993, 24 in 1994, 30 in 1995, and the remainder be i ng built by 1996. These 
high annual production rates would have required funding levels approaching $9 billion a year i n the 
mid-1990s. See John D. Morrocco, "Opposition to B-2 Threatens Viability of Strategic Triad," Aviation Week 
and Space Technology, 19 March 1990, p.49; Andrew Rosenthal, "Stealth Bomber And Its Billions Are Under 
Fire," New York Times, 24 June 1989, p.1; and Melissa Healy "Cheney Asks Full Product i on of B-2 , " Los 
Angeles Times, 14 December 1989, p.1. 
46. For greater detail on costing methods see Bill Sweetman, "B-2 Costs: when a $ i s not a $, " Janes Defence 
Weekly, 23 September 1989, p.619; and "One On One," a Defense News interview with Major General Richard 
Scofield, B-2 Program-Director, Defense News, 4 June 1990, p.44. 
47. See John D. Morrocco, "Defense Department Grapples With Massive Spending Cuts," Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, 27 November 1989, p.18. 
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1991, eight planes in 1992 and 1993, followed by 12 in 1994. The remaining 
aircraft would be bought at a rate of 12 per year until the 75 aircraft were 
delivered to the USAF. 48 
Although the total cost of the B-2 programme had fallen from $75.6 to around 
$64.7 billion, the unit cost of each aircraft had risen to about $865 million 
(flyaway cost around $500 million). For FY-92, the Bush Administration requested 
a total of $3.2 billion for a further four B-2s but was granted $1.8 billion to 
maintain Northrop's production base for the bomber, $1.6 billion for research and 
development and the possibility of an extra $1 billion which was dependant on 
tagon certification that the B-2 meet all of its stealth requirements. 49 Sensing 
a Congressional impetus toward capping the B-2 programme at the 15 aircraft now 
authorised, the USAF argued that while the first 15 aircraft would cost around 
$39.2 billion, the remaining 60 could be purchased for a modest $21.6 billion; 
that is 35% of the total B-2 budget would purchase 80% of the proposed fleet. 50 
While this figure would appear favourable at first glance, the fact remains 
that B-2 continues to consume a significant portion of both defence and USAF 
procurement funding each fiscal year. 
total of $9.024 billion authorised for 
the B-2 accounted for $2.8 billion or 
For the most recent year (FY-92) from a 
the DoD's top 10 procurement programmes, 
31% of the total. From a total of $6.781 
billion authorised for the USAF's top six procurement programmes, the B-2s $2.8 
billion allocation represents a substantial 41.3%.51 Although the USAF makes no 
secret of the fact that the B-2 is its highest strategic priority, critics have 
regularly charged that in order to sustain and protect B-2 funding lower priority 
programmes are being cancelled or severely pruned. Cuts to the Short-Range Attack 
Missile-Tactical (SRAM-T) and the now cancelled rail-mobile Peacekeeper missile 
have been cited as examples of the USAF's whittling of strategic programmes in 
favour of the B-2. Although the USAF rejects allegations of favouritism it 
nonetheless concedes that "if it just so happens that anything we've restructured 
or cancelled in the past or are considering for the future frees up money [for 
the B-2] then so be it. ,,52 
48. Barbara Amouyal and Philip Finnegan, "Impasse Looms For B-2 Funds," Defense News, 28 May 1990, p. 1, 37. 
49. The request and subsequent authorisation were made against the backdrop of a six year defence plan that cuts 
military buying power 37% every year between 1991 and 1997, atop an 11.3% cut between FY-90 and FY-91. The 
FY-92 defence budget request of $278.3 billion was the lowest since 1985. By 1996 the Pentagon would spend 
less of the US GNP on defence (3.6%) than in any year since 1939. See "$278.3 Billion Defense Budget Set to 
Drop 14% More by 1997," Armed Forces Journal International (March 1991): p.17, and Patricia A Gilmartin, 
"Bill Reordering u.S. Defense Priorities Leaves B-2 Program Close to Death," Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, 11 November 1991, p.25. 
50. See David F. Bond, "USAF Will Need Another $2.6 Billion to Complete Acquisition of 15 B-2s," Aviation Week 
and Space Technology, 16/23 December 1991, p.22. 
51. These figures are based on data contained in the following articles: James C. Hyde and Glenn W. Woodman Jnr, 
"Congress Funds Nearly 70% of DoD's Top 25 Programs," Armed Forces Journal International (December 1991): 
pp.9-12, and Gilmartin, "Bill Reordering Defense Priorities," p.28. 
52. Cited in George F. Leopold and Barbara Opall, "B-2 Gains in Air Force Budget Maneuvers," [sic] Defense News, 
12 August 1991, p.4, 29. 
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Not unlike the earlier plan to acquire 132 B-2s the 75 bomber plan has also 
become a casualty of post-cold war realities. As part of a five year plan 
announced by President Bush in January to save $50 billion in the defence budget, 
the B-2 programme has been capped at 20 aircraft which in itself is expected to 
save $14.7 billion. 53 Confronted with the fact there will be no more than 20 B-2s 
the USAF has now begun a determined campaign to convince Congress that the full 
compliment of 20 and not 15 bombers should be authorised. 
The opening salvo was fired by Air Force Secretary Rice on 20 February when he 
informed the House Armed Services Committee that the difference between a 15 
bomber force, as proposed by Congress and the 20 B-2s requested by the USAF is 
only $2.6 billion and the additional cost would yield significant results. Rice 
explained that a 20 bomber force would provide 15 operational aircraft for 
extended contingencies from domestic and foreign bases but a 15 bomber force 
would yield only 10 aircraft which would be sufficient only as a "silver bullet" 
force for use in one-day raids of the type conducted against Libya in 1986. 
Echoing Secretary Cheney's remarks more than two years ago when he justified the 
requirement for a 75 bomber force,54 Rice concluded that: 
The choice to complete 20 B-2s was carefully weighed. The 
demands of training, maintenance, 
factors convinced us that the force 
would fall short of the capability we 
and other operational 
of 15 proposed by some 
need. 55 
While the operational imperatives for a 20 as opposed to 15 bomber fleet appear 
credible the unit cost projections are almost the opposite. The most recent USAF 
calculations put the cost of completing 20 bombers at $44.4 billion which results 
in a unit cost approaching a staggering 2.26 billion dollars. When using the 
USAF's preferred flyaway cost measure, however, a 15 bomber force is said to cost 
$939 million apiece and a 20 bomber force about $450 million apiece. Assistant 
Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Jack Welsh, 
unit cost to overinvestment in facilities, tooling 
programme stretch-outs that have nearly doubled the 
B_2. 56 
attributed the escalating 
and training along with 
production time for the 
53. For details of the pLan see, CharLes ALdinger, "Pentagon Proposes Major SLowdown In Arms Purchases," Reuters 
Report, Washington D.C., 29 January 1992. 
54. Cheney said that two wings or 75 B-2s was the absoLute mlnlmum force LeveL required to perform a SlOP 
mission effectiveLy whi Le capitaL ising on investments made in Logistics, training and infrastucture. See 
Barbara AmouyaL, "After Cheney ProposaL, Firms Gird For Even Steeper Aircraft Cuts," Defense News, 30 ApriL 
1990, p.11. 
55. DonaLd Rice, Secretary of the Air Force, Reshaping the Future, Testimony to the HASC, 20 February 1992, 
p.10. 
56. The USAF expects to receive 12 B-2s between 1993 and 1995 with the Last aircraft reaching the inventory at 
the turn of the century. See Barbara OpaLL, "Rice pushes 20 Bomber B-2 FLeet for Extra $2.6 BiLLion, Defense 
News, 24 February, p.76; and Barbara OpaLL, "WeLch Says AF Won't Repeat B-2 Excesses," Defense News, 4-10 
May 1992, p.3. 
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The decision to curtail the programme at 20 aircraft has lifted a certain 
amount of pressure off the B-2s future but given the substantial sum required to 
complete a 20 bomber plan and the problems in the low observables testing 
programme, Congress may yet withold funding for completion of the force. Should 
this occur the problems of cost-effectiveness of a small force and maintenance of 
a credible strategic bomber force in the longer term will need to be addressed. 
For the moment, however, the cornerstone of the USAF's case for the B-2 is the 
identification of a credible mission. 
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3 
B-2 IN SEARCH OF A MISSION 
US Nuclear Targeting Policy 
The past decade has witnessed two significant developments in US targeting 
policy. The first has been a shift from targeting the Soviet Union's means of 
economic recovery after war to targeting the Soviet capacity to make war. The 
second development has been a growing US interest in acquiring the capability to 
wage a prolonged and controlled nuclear war. The genesis of these developments 
began with a major Nuclear Targeting Policy Review conducted by the Carter 
Administration in 1977-79 and culminated in a new SIOP, designated 6F, which came 
into effect on 1 October 1989. 1 
The new targeting policy and SIOP was described by President Reagan in January 
1988 as follows: 
Our strategic forces and associated targeting policy must, by 
any calculation, be perceived as making nuclear warfare a 
totally unacceptable and unrewarding proposition for the 
Soviet leadership. Accordingly our targeting policy: 
Denies the Soviets the ability to achieve essential 
military objectives by holding at risk Soviet 
war-making capabilities including both the full range 
of Soviet military forces and the war-supporting 
industry which provides the foundation for Soviet 
military power and supports its capability to conduct a 
protracted conflict: and 
Places at risk those political entities the Soviet 
leadership values most: the mechanisms for ensuring 
survival of the Communist Party and its leadership 
cadres, and for retention of the Party ' s control over 
the Soviet and Soviet-bloc peoples. 2 
1. For a comprehensive and detai led explanation of the major pol icy documents formulated in this period see 
Desmond Ball, The Evolution of United States Strategic Policy Since 1945: Doctrine, Military Technical 
Innovation, And Force Structure. Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) Reference Paper no . 164 (The 
Australian National University, Canberra 1989), pp.21-38. 
I bid., p. 33 . 
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In essence, the policy states that the Soviet leadership's main objectives in a 
nuclear war would be preservation of political and military power in order to 
prosecute a "successful" nuclear war against the US. The notion of the Soviet 
Union having a war-winning capability has been fuelled by developments in Soviet 
nuclear forces. Former USAF Chief of Staff, General Welch, has referred to: 
Growing numbers of prompt, accurate offensive systems; 
steadily increasing hardness of nuclear forces, command, 
control and leadership facilities; increasing emphasis on 
redundancy, dispersion, and mobility of forces and command 
and control assets; and continuing modernization and 
expansion of an extensive strategic defense system 
[indicate] forces more suited to a war-winning strategy than 
an assured destruction strategy.3 
These developments suggest that any Soviet victory would be contingent upon 
maintenance of significant survivable nuclear forces and C3 . 4 As indicated by 
President Reagan's statement and SIOP-6F, the key goal for the US is to deny the 
Soviet Union such reserve forces. 
Central to this goal is the capability to locate, track and destroy Soviet 
strategic-relocatable targets, especially mobile missiles. Since 1982 there has 
been a substantial increase in the number of Soviet strategic relocatable 
targets. In 1984 there were about 4,000 relocatable targets in the National 
Strategic Target List,5 comprising mobile air defence batteries, submarines, 
bombers and tank and troop concentrations on manoeuvre. 
SS-25 (Sickle) road-mobile, single-warhead ICBM in 1985, 
The deployment of the 
and SS-24 (Scalpel) 
rail-mobile, multiple-warhead ICBM in 1987, exacerbated US fears of a more potent 
and invulnerable Soviet ICBM force. By the end of 1991 analysts estimated that 
315 SS-25 and 90 SS-24 had been operationally deployed . 6 By the end of the 
century the possibility exists that nearly half of all Soviet strategic nuclear 
targets could be mobile, including two-thirds of their ICBMs. 
The US response was to dramatically accelerate its strategic relocatable target 
research programmes. In 1985, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) established a 
Mobile Missile Task Force Intelligence Requirements and Analysis Group to study 
3. Cited in Michael C. Brower, Targeting Mobile Nuclear Forces: Technical Prospects and Implications, Union of 
Concerned Scientists. (Massachusetts, 15 February 1988), p.6. 
4. Victor Utgoff, "In Defense of Counterforce," International Security, vol. 6, no. 4 (Spring 1982): p.48. 
5. Air Force Magazine, vol. 67, no . 12 (December 1984): p.23. 
6. The deployment of both missile systems continues, although the former Soviet Union announced that production 
of the SS-24 ceased on 1 January 1991. At that time 36 launchers had been mounted on 12 trains wh i ch were 
deployed at three sites. It is estimated that about a further 54 SS-24 have been deployed in former SS-19 
silos. SS-25 deployment has now probably exceeded 320; the missile was first seen at the October Day Parade 
on 7 November 1990. It is reliably claimed that follow-ons to both systems are under development. See 
"International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)," The Military Balance 1991-1992, (London 1991), p.88 . 
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the problem of locating and targeting Soviet mobile missiles. Their report, filed 
on 11 December 1986, drew attention to the fact that new capabilities were 
required to meet the challenges posed by strategic relocatable targets: 
Our current capability to meet adequately the demands placed 
upon our limited resources, to address effectively the mobile 
missile problem, is limited. 
A true capability to locate, identify and track mobile 
missiles for the purposes of targeting is evolutionary. 
[It] will require signif icant enhancement of our present 
b 'l ' t' 7 capa 1. 1. 1.es. 
In 1987 the Pentagon formulated a Relocatable Target Master Plan that is 
keyed to the development of sensors, command, control, communications and 
intelligence (C3 I) architectures and force structure necessary to put at risk 
those Soviet targets in the future. 8 The requirements to locate strategic 
relocatable targets pr ior to and dur ing a nuclear exchange has led to the 
development of new sensor systems such as the Aurora Mach-5 Steal th 
reconnaissance aircraft,9 advanced geostationary signals intelligence (SIGINT) 
satellites such as Magnum and Mentor,10 the KH-12 Ikon real-time digital-imaging 
satellite,ll and the Lacrosse radar satellite system. 12 
The USAF's interest in strategic relocatable target research was given added 
impetus in that it offered a potentially viable mission for the manned 
penetrating bomber. In 1986 the USAF argued: 
Because of the increased Soviet emphasis on mobile ICBM 
delivery systems and command centers, the manned bombers 
real-time potential for locating and destroying relocatable 
systems is vital to the maintenance of a viable triad. 13 
7. Cited in Gregory A. Fossedal, "US said to be unable to verify missile ban," Washington Times, 18 November 
1987, p.6; and Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "What About the Hidden SS-20 I s?," Washington Post, 18 
November 1987, p.26. 
8. Edgar Ulsamer, "Missiles and Targets," Air Force Magazine, vol. 70, no. 7 (July 1987): p.69. 
9. See Richard Halloran, "US To Build Spy Plane That Radar Canlt Spot," International Herald Tribune, 11 
January 1988, pp.1, 5. 
10. See Desmond Ball, Pine Gap; Australia and the US Geostationary Signals Intelligence Satellite Program, 
(Sydney 1988). 
11. See William E. Burrows, Deep Black: Space Espionage and National Security, (New York 1986), pp.307-309. 
12. See Craig Covault, "Atlantis Radar Satellite Payload Opens New Reconnaissance Era," Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, 12 December 1988, pp.26-28. 
13. Cited in James W. Canan, liThe Issues That Count," Air Force Magazine, vol. 69, no. 10 (October 1986): p.49. 
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To support this potential mission the USAF requested $985,000 (FY-87$)14 for a 
new programme called Strategic Relocatable Target Capability, the purpose of 
which was to explore improvements in sensors, electronics and operational 
procedures that would enable bombers to hunt mobile targets. 15 The bomber's role 
in threatening Soviet strategic relocatable targets was also increasingly 
reflected in war plans. According to Lieutenant General Bernard Randolph, then 
Commander, Air Force Systems Command, "bombers are assigned about half of the 
SlOP warheads,,,16 of which a large percentage are most likely to be dedicated to 
the destruction of Soviet strategic relocatable targets. 
Concurrently, the USAF had been gradually deploying the B-1B and steadily 
developing the B-2 bomber. While the B-1B was considered a possible candidate for 
accepting operational tasking against some strategic relocatable targets,17 it 
was clear that locating and destroying strategic relocatable targets was a prime 
objective of the B-2 Stealth bomber. As General Chain noted in July 1987: 
The highly flexible Advanced Technology Bomber, with a 
low-observable design will penetrate enemy airspace and hold 
all types of targets, both fixed and relocatable, at risk. 
This is important given the growing portion of the Soviet 
target base that will be relocatable in the next decade. 18 
And as USAF officials stated in early 1988, that "With its projected capability 
to dash into the Soviet Union undetected the B-2 [will] be able to roam the 
strongholds of the mobile Soviet missiles and look for targets. ,,19 
The complexity of such a mission is readily apparent and to most observers the 
chances of a lone B-2 successfully penetrating a dense, modern air defence system 
and then independently detecting, recognising, acquiring and attacking a 
strategic relocatable target are highly improbable. 
Penetrating soviet Air Defence 
The Soviet Air Defense Forces, Voyska Protivovozdushnoy Oborony (VPVO), 
currently field approximately 8,650 surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers in 
some 1,200 sites, more than 2,370 interceptor aircraft and 10,000 air defence 
14. "FY-1988 Air Force RTD&E Conference Budget," Defense Daily, 2 December 1987, p.194. 
15. Ulsamer, "Missiles and Targets," p.69. 
16. Lieutenant General Bernard P. Randolph, liThe B-2 Bomber Technology in Transition;" a speech delivered to the 
1989 Aviation Writers Association National News Conference, Phoenix, Arizona, 29 April 1989 . Reproduced in 
Vital Speeches of the Day, 1 June 1989, p.495. As a result of the dissolution of the USSR and subsequent 
cuts to the US strategic arsenal, the number of SlOP warheads to be allocated to be carried by bombers and 
accordingly, the percentage allocated to the destruction of relocatable targets is being rev i ewed. 
17. See "Countering Mobile Targets a B-1B Task?," Defense Electronics, vol. 18, no. 3 (March 1986): p.18. 
18. General John T. Chain Jr, "Strategic Fundamentals," Air Force Magazine, vol. 70, no. 7 (July 1987): p.67 . 
19. Cited in R.S. Dudney, "Strategic Forces at the Brink of START," Air Force Magazine, vol. 71 , no. 2 (February 
1988): p.43. 
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radars. 20 While many of the surface-to-air missiles deployed are of 1950s and 
1960s design, a modernisation programme to upgrade air defences against emerging 
technologies such as stealth is underway. Soviet strategic SAMS (the SA-2, SA-3, 
SA-5 and SA-I0 Grumble) provide barrier, area and point defence of the Soviet 
Union. Although the number of strategic SAM sites and launchers has declined as 
older generation systems are retired, overall capability has increased. Moreover, 
a trend away from fixed SAM and radar sites to mobile systems is expected to 
complicate the task of locating and destroying them. The SA-I0 Grumble which is 
replacing older SA-2 and SA-3 SAMS has improved Soviet air defence capabilities 
against low-altitude aircraft and cruise-missile attacks, and now constitutes 
approximately one quarter of Soviet strategic SAM launchers. 21 
Given the recent low-observables test results, it is now unlikely that the B-2 
could independently penetrate the air defence network of the Soviet Union. An 
active modernisation programme which includes mobility for both SAM launchers and 
air defence radars increases the uncertainty. The recent war in the Gulf provided 
several clues about how a B-2 might fare against a dense, modern air defence 
system. A stealth "cousin" of the B-2, the F-117A fighter/bomber was highly 
successful in remaining undetected by Iraqi air defences and conducting surprise 
raids, but initial penetration had been simplified by F-4 wild Weasel anti-radar 
aircraft and AH-64 Apache helicopters working in tandem to suppress early warning 
air defence radar and SAM batteries. Noting the USAF concession that the B-2 will 
also require this type of penetration assistance on conventional missions, it is 
difficult to conceive how the B-2 will penetrate on a nuclear mission where such 
assistance is not available. 
The Soviet reaction to eventual deployment of the B-2 has been muted. Former 
Chief of Soviet Air Force, Colonel-General Evgeny Shaposhnikov22 confirmed that 
his country is developing new air defence systems for "repelling stealth-class 
weapons" but is awaiting a US decision on B-2 deployment before implementing its 
"defensive answer. ,,23 This answer is thought to be in the form of follow-on 
aircraft to the MIG-29 Fulcrum and SU-27 Flanker fighters along with 
modernisation of existing SAM defences. 24 The prospective small size of the B-2 
force and revelations that the B-2 is not as stealthy as first thought will not 
have gone unnoticed by the Soviet Union. The B-2, while continuing to pose a 
considerable technological challenge, is unlikely to generate substantial changes 
to the Soviet Air Defence modernisation programme. 
20. The Military Balance 1991-1992, p.38. See also John Lepingwell, "Soviet Strategic Air Defense and the 
Stealth Challenge," International Security, vol. 14, no. 2 (Fall 1989): p.72. 
21. 1991 Military Forces In transition, Department of Defense, (Washington, D.C., September 1991), p.38. 
22. Following the abortive coup in August 1991 Shaposhnikov was promoted by Boris Yeltsin to Marshall of the 
Soviet Union and following the dissolution of the USSR appointed Head of the Armed Forces of the CIS. Now 
his post is in limbo following the establ ishment of the independent Russian Armed Forces led by Defence 
Minister General Pavel Grachev. 
23. Cited in Nick Cook, "Soviets to Deploy Two New Fighters," Janes Defence Weekly, 27 July 1992, p.132. 
24. Ibid. 
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Attacking strategic Relocatable Targets 
To carry out "hunter-killer" missions against Soviet strategic relocatable 
targets, including SS-24 and SS-25 mobile ICBMs, the B-2 would be required to 
combine surveillance, target detection, target recognition, target acquisition 
and weapon delivery largely independent of distant support forces. This is a 
considerable tasking assignment for a single aircraft and, not surprisingly , 
there are many difficulties involved. 
The magnitude of the surveillance problem confronting the B-2 over the Soviet 
Union is daunting. The primary strategic relocatable targets - mobile missiles -
can disperse (theoretically) into 22 million square kilometres of territory. 
Within that area are 550,000 kilometres of sealed, 1 million kilometres of 
unsealed roads and 230,000 kilometres of railway.25 While mobile missiles will 
most likely stay in garrison areas 26 during peacetime and hence be less difficult 
to locate, their dispersal upon strategic or tactical warning would make the 
B-2's surveillance and tracking task very difficult. Obviously the bomber would 
rely on assistance from satellite sensors. The latter's capacity for broad-area 
surveillance compared with the B-2 is illustrated by the following example: 
Suppose that Soviet SS-25s were to hide in clearings 60 
meters wide and surrounded by trees 20 meters tall. Geometry 
shows ... a stealth bomber flying at 10km altitude would 
have a clear line of sight to the SS-25 from 15 km away ... 
This represents a rather small area of coverage - 700 square 
kilometres - compared to the area in which the SS-25s might 
be hidden A satellite at 500 km altitude, by contrast, 
could see the SS-25 from a horizontal range of roughly 750 
krn, allowing it effectively to view close to two million 
square kilometres at one time. 27 
The capability to locate and track strategic relocatable targets has been built 
into the KH-12 Ikon real-time imaging satellite, the Lacrosse radar satellite and 
the Magnum/Mentor geostationary SIGINT satellites. However, as pointed out by 
Desmond Ball, these systems are poorly configured for real-time war fighting 
tasks and more suited to the demands of intelligence verification and analysis. 28 
25. Cited in Brower, "Targeting Mobile Nuclear Forces," p.33 
26. As a positive step toward verifying mobi le ICBMs both superpowers agreed at the June 1988 Moscow SUlllTlit 
that: both road and rail mobile ICBMs be based in agreed areas of limited size; a percentage of the mobile 
force would be allowed outside the basing area at all times; dispersals involving up to the entire force 
would also be allowed for exercise purposes but limited in frequency and duration; dispersals for national 
emergencies be unrestricted; and deployments and movements be subject to rigorous notification, inspection 
and other verification measures. Many issues remain unresolved, notably the size of restricted locations. 
See Robert Einhorn liThe Emerging START Agreement," Survival, vol. 30, no.5 (September/October 1988): 
pp.389-90. 
27. Brower, "Targeting Mobile Nuclear Forces," p.32. 
28. Private conversation. 
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Moreover, to maintain continuous tracking of strategic relocatable targets a 
larger number of those satellites would be required than the anticipated four 
KH-12s and four Lacrosse to be deployed. 29 
satellites may also become vulnerable to anti-satellite weapons such as space 
mines and nuclear warheads delivered by ICBMs. The c3 links between satellites, 
ground stations, and bombers may be subject to jamming and/or severely degraded 
in the initial stages of a nuclear war. Making ground-based c3 less vulnerable 
through mobility may be offset by a reduction in size and in capability.30 In 
short: "For missions which rely on expensive and complicated satellites in 
low-earth orbit, the outlook is not good".31 
Even if the field of search is narrowed to a much smaller area, the B-2 and its 
sensors still face a number of complex problems. Consider the following example: 
Suppose a B-2 bomber was assigned the task of searching 
10,000 square kilometres of Soviet territory. Assuming the 
bomber's sensor (say, radar) could detect objects at least 
one metre in size, it would have to examine 10 billion 
resolution cells [patches of ground equal in size to its 
resolution] one metre across to search the entire region. 
Suppose further that for every million cells the radar 
detected what appeared to be a missile, but was actually a 
false alarm. The bomber's computer and crew would have to 
sort through 10,000 false targets to find the dozen or so 
real ones. 32 
The requirement for automatic target detection, recognition and discrimination 
is essential. But each of these steps in turn raises further difficulties. 
Detection systems operate most proficiently when the contrast between targets 
and background is high. On land this contrast is complicated by clutter such as 
trees, rocks and houses. Should the target move it could be detected through a 
process known as doppler frequency shift. 33 Stationary targets are much harder to 
detect and it is expected that mobile ICBMs would be in this category once they 
had dispersed to a fir ing location. To exacerbate the detection problem the 
Soviet Union could employ counter-measures to reduce the thermal and radar 
visibility of targets. Hot engines and exhausts could be concealed beneath 
vehicles while thermal insulation, camouflage netting, foliage and low-emissivity 
paints could further reduce thermal signature. 34 
29. See Michael C Brower, "Targeting Soviet Mobile Missiles: Prospects and Implications," Survival, vol. 31, 
no.S (September/October 1989): p.438; and Brower, "Targeting Mobile Nuclear Forces," pp.36-37. 
30. Ibid, p.37. 
31. Cited in Brower, "Targeting Soviet Mobile Missiles," p.437. 
32. Ibid, p.439. 
33. Brower, "Targeting Mobile Nuclear Forces," p.40 
34. Ibid, p.41. According to a June 1989 Report prepared by Los Almos National Laboratory Scientists, impulse 
radar is considered a good candidate for detecting targets in the presence of background clutter. See Scott, 
"U~B Radar," p.39. 
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Automatic target recognition and discrimination techniques, that is, the 
ability to distinguish between real and false targets using computers, are still 
at an early stage of development and have proved "a difficult and elusive goal, 
especially for stationary targets. ,,35 Not unlike target detection, recognition is 
characterised by probabilities of correct and false target classification. Most 
methods of target recognition involve extracting several different features from 
a suspected target (radar cross-section or thermal signature) and comparing them 
to features of known targets stored in a computer memory. The process operates 
best when there is clear contrast between the target's features and those of 
other objects. But these methods entail considerable cost, computational speed 
and complexity in the number of operations to be performed. The effect of random 
noise, camouflage, and stealth may blur the contrast between the target's 
features and those of surrounding clutter, resulting in objects being incorrectly 
identified as a target. The latter problem would be aggravated if the Soviet 
Union deployed decoys of their strategic relocatable targets. 36 
The last step in the process of attacking strategic relocatable targets is 
destroying them once they are located. The B-2 will be armed with AGM-137 
Tri-Service Stand Off Attack Missiles (TSSAM) and nuclear gravity bombs such as 
the B-61 and B-63, but the latter would be used primarily for fixed, hardened 
targets such as underground c3 bunkers. With determining the precise location of 
strategic relocatable targets very much in doubt, the US Department of Energy's 
nuclear laboratories have been developing a new aerial bomb that would generate 
high-power microwaves over a wide area and destroy electronic equipment 
controlling ground-based Soviet mobile missiles. 37 The drawbacks associated with 
this weapon, however, are that they induce "soft-kill" with no outward sign of 
damage to weapon systems, making damage assessment difficult. Furthermore, many 
systems could be protected against microwave pulses. By having electronic 
components in conducting boxes or Farraday cages, microwaves could be blocked. 
Also, measures could be taken to guard against voltage and current surge. 38 
Nonetheless, it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of these measures short 
of detonating a nuclear weapon in the atmosphere. 
There is no doubt that fundamental problems exist in achieving the task of 
locating 
missiles. 
and attacking strategic relocatable 
Finding strategic relocatable targets 
targets, particularly mob i le 
in a large region of the Soviet 
Union in a short time does not appear practicable for many years , if at all. This 
view is now increasingly shared by the USAF. General Welch testified in November 
1988 that "the whole business of locating mobile missiles, for example, is a very 
complex task and we're a long way from having decided that we know how to handle 
that task.,,39 
35. Brower, "Targeting Mobile Nuclear Forces," p.42. 
36. Ibid, pp.43-48. 
37. loIalter Pincus, "DOE Studies New Bomb To Disable Mobile Missiles," loIashington Pos t, 2 February 1990 , p . 19 . 
38. Brower, "Targeting Mobile Nuclear Forces," p.42. 
39. Cited in Richard Halloran, "General Says Stealth Craft loIill Target Soviet Shelters," New York Times, 20 
November 1988, p.24. 
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And in July 1989 the USAF told Congress that "attacking highly mobile targets 
is [not] likely to be accomplished with great efficiency in the near to mid-term 
future. ,,40 
Most recently the Gulf War graphically illustrated the difficulties of locating 
and attacking mobile missiles. Many of the mobile Iraqi Scud B missiles fired at 
both Israel and Saudi Arabia during the course of the war proved difficult to 
locate and attack despite the vast array of surveillance and tracking systems at 
the allies' disposal. According to SAC Commander, General Lee Butler, the B-2 may 
help solve the thorny problem of how to find and target mobile missiles but only 
in that it may have better endurance over hostile territory to search for mobile 
targets. 41 
While conceding that the strategic relocatable target mission is very 
difficult, the USAF has by no means abandoned it. Research programs aimed at 
improving the ability of both the B-1 and B-2 to find mobile targets continue. 
Defence contractor Martin Marietta has developed the Low-Altitude Navigation and 
Targeting Infrared System for Night, for installation on a B-1 for 18 months of 
testing. The programme will include the study of sensor management systems for 
the critical mobile targeting role. Another SRT programme for the B-1 and B-2 has 
been underway at Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio, for two years. Specialists are 
studying the combination of radar and automatic target recognition algorithms for 
use against SRTs or conventional theatre ballistic missiles such as Scuds. 
Despite these developments prospects for the immediate future are not bright. An 
operational capability for such systems is expected to be at least several years 
away. 42 
Even if technical obstacles to locating and tracking strategic relocatable 
targets could be overcome, other operational difficulties remain. In an intra-war 
environment complex operations would have to be carried out amidst widespread 
destruction of military facilities and c 3 . A good example of this concerns 
reconstitution of the bomber force. With the bomber's relatively slow speed and 
restricted altitude only a small percentage of Soviet territory could be covered 
on a single, several-hour mission. As a result, the aircraft must fly multiple 
sorties, leaving Soviet airspace periodically for fuel and maintenance. Aerial 
refuelling, however, depends on precise co-ordination between tanker aircraft and 
bombers - this could not be guaranteed where c3 systems are either destroyed or 
severely degraded. Moreover, the military and civilian bases needed to service 
the aircraft and assist flight-crew endurance, could suffer attack. Without these 
facilities sustained bomber operations would be difficult. Adding to this problem 
40. IIIndustry Generally Upbeat on Management Review,lI Defense Daily, 13 July 1989, p.66. 
41. See John D Morrocco, "Shift in U.s. Military Strategy Calls For Increasing SAC's Conventional Role," 
Aviation Week and Space Technology, 13 May 1991, p.28. 
42. See David A. Fulgham, "Force Drawdowns Limits u.S. Ability to Fight Dual Conflicts," Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, 6 April 1992, p.20. 
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is the USAF admission that the B-2 would require "frequent structural and 
propulsion maintenance in a ser ies of specialised hangars to maintain the 
bomber's low-observable features.,,43 This could be a problematic in a crisis or 
war. However, maintaining the bomber's stealthy features so it can elude Soviet 
air defences seems unnecessary given that US SLBMs, ICBMs and cruise missiles 
would have already destroyed or opened-up large gaps in the air defence network. 
In fact this operating environment of total nuclear war and degraded air defences 
would reduce the need for the B-2's sophisticated stealth characteristics and 
penetrating bomber role. 
More important than the technical feasibility of the strategic relocatable 
target mission is the question of whether or not attacking Soviet mobile nuclear 
forces adds to or detracts from nuclear stability. If the purpose of having 
mobile nuclear forces is to provide insurance against a first strike and ensure 
retaliatory capability, then any concerted attempts to target those forces must 
be considered destabilising. Similarly, if the US was able to successfully 
threaten mobile missiles the Soviet Union would be inclined to permanently hide 
them, and in the process damage hopes for negotiated limits and verification 
procedures. 
Alternative Nuclear Missions 
With the strategic relocatable target mission beset by criticism, the Pentagon 
and USAF have increasingly de-emphasised this role for the B-2. Greater attention 
is now being drawn to other nuclear and non-nuclear roles. The following USAF 
statement indicates this shift: 
The B-2 may be at the heart of solving the mobile ICBM 
problem, but the mobile missile issue is not at the heart of 
the B-2 requirement. The B-2's primary mission is deterrence 
across the spectrum of conflict. The B-2 can also 
deliver highly accurate large-yield warheads against 
high-value fixed targets such as hardened underground command 
centers and ICBM silos. And target other mobile war 
fighting assets, including armies out of garrison. 44 
In a similar vein, former SAC Commander General Chain stated that "the B-2 may 
assess targets for damage level prior to striking, thus assuring the required 
level of damage on the most critical targets and also provid[e] economy of 
force.,,45 
43. Cited in R. Jeffrey Smith, "Tough B-2 Questions: The Bomber's Task, It's Cost and the Ai r Forces l 
Arguments," International Herald Tribune, 28 July 1989 , p.? 
44. Cited in Robert Ropelewski, "USAF Back pedal ing on B-2 Relocatable Target Mi ss i on," Armed Forces Journa l 
International, (July 1989): p.14. 
45. US Congress, Senate,"Exon re General Chain's Letter," p.54965. 
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The alternative nuclear missions have also encountered a significant degree of 
criticism. 
As noted in Chapter One, the bomber's role in attacking fixed, hardened targets 
may be diminished by deployment of the Trident II D-5 SLBM. Nonetheless, USAF 
officials maintain there are some very hard, fixed targets which need to be 
attacked with high-yield weapons of the type carried on penetrating bombers. 46 
Targets of this nature, however, are most likely to be defended by heavy 
point-defences forcing the bomber to carry a larger proportion of short-range 
attack missiles than high-yield gravity bombs. Cruise missiles are regarded by 
many commentators as a better all-round weapon for attacking hardened, fixed 
targets in a follow-on attack. The USAF itself admits that "Air-launched cruise 
missiles are effective weapons for attacking preplanned, fixed hardened strategic 
targets. ,,47 The ALCM can also be fitted with earth-penetrating warheads to 
increase their effectiveness against very deep, hardened targets. As with 
threatening mobile missiles, endangering Soviet leadership and c3 assets can be 
considered destabilising as it may cause the Soviet Union to act massively and 
decisively at the onset of a strategic nuclear exchange. Accordingly, any 
prospects for escalation control and negotiating war-termination would be lost. 
The second alternative nuclear mission for the B-2 - providing real-time damage 
assessment and follow-on coverage to achieve required damage levels would see a 
bomber arriving at the target area several hours after an initial attack by 
SLBMs, ICBMs or ALCMs. If the aircraft's sensors and visual observation conf i rm 
that the first attack had been unsuccessful, the bomber would then re-attack the 
target. 48 To many critics this mission appears little more than a "mopping-up" 
exercise after an initial nuclear exchange. This role was also proposed for the 
ill-fated B-70 (renamed RS-70 for reconnaissance strike) bomber but then, as now, 
it was difficult to justify the mission commensurate with the bomber's cost . As 
put by General Maxwell Taylor when he opposed the RS-70: "Is it worth several 
billion dollars ... to be able to overfly Soviet targets with a few score of 
manned bombers looking for residual [targets] after each country ... has already 
exchanged several thousand megatons of nuclear fire power on their respective 
target systems?,,49 
Similarly, the costly billion B-2 programme looks a very expensive proposition 
in order to make "the rubble bounce twice." 50 Other means for establishing 
whether US missiles had detonated properly within close proximity to the i r 
46. Cited in Senator William S. Cohen, liThe B-2 Bomber : Mission Questionable, Cost Impossible , " Arms Contro l 
Today, vol.19, no.8 (October 1989): p.5. 
4? See Jasper Welch, "Assessing the Value of Stealthy Aircraft and Cruise Missiles," International Security, 
vol.14, no.2 (Fall 1989): pp.54-56. 
48. See Cohen, liThe B-2 Bomber," p.5. 
49. Cited in Michael C. Brower, "Why the B-2 Will Bomb: The Problems Stealth Can't Hide," Arms Contro l Today, 
vol.18, no.? (September 1988): p.20. 
50. Cited in Melissa Healy, "If Stealth Is Nightmare, Critics Wonder Whose," Los Angeles Times, 21 November 
1988, p.20. 
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targets could include the Navstar satellites which are beyond the reach of 
current anti-satellite capabilities, or the new Aurora Mach-5 reconnaissance 
aircraft. The information provided could be relayed to surviving us SLBMs or 
ALCMs which would then re-attack. 51 But this scenario also seems implausible 
considering the likely amount of damage that would be incurred by both sides 
(military and c 3 assets) in a nuclear exchange. 
The B-2 and START 
Adding further doubt to the B-2s nuclear utility is the impact of the Strategic 
Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the contraction of nuclear targets. The START 
signed in Moscow in July 199152 allows both the US and the former Soviet Union no 
more than 1600 deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) and 6000 
accountable warheads. No more than 4900 warheads can be carried on ballistic 
missiles and of these no more than 1100 can be deployed on mobile ICBMs. The 
Treaty, however, allows considerable flexibility to substitute weapons within 
these limits. In particular, bomber carried weapons are counted more leniently 
than ballistic missile warheads because they are considered more stabilising and 
less suitable for use as a first-strike weapon. Under START limits all of the 
gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles carried by a penetrating bomber 
count as only one warhead but ten re-entry vehicles (RVs) carried on a ballistic 
missile count as ten warheads. In addition, each of up to 150 US heavy bombers 
carrying ALCMs counts for ten warheads (even though each aircraft may carry up to 
20 ALCMs), and each of up to 180 former Soviet heavy bombers carrying ALCMs 
counts for eight warheads (even though each aircraft may carry up to 16 ALCMs) . 
Each heavy bomber over the specified number is accountable for the maximum number 
of long-range, nuclear-armed ALCMs for which a bomber of that type and variant is 
actually equipped. 53 
In January President Bush announced in his State of the Union Address that the 
US would consider cutting the number of actual bomber delivered weapons from 4500 
to 1900. In response, President Yeltsin proposed cuts to around 800. At their 
June Summit meeting the two Presidents agreed that the actual number of warheads 
retained by each side would fall to between 3000 and 3500 by the year 2003, or as 
early as 2000 if the US can contribute to dismantling Russian strategic arms. 54 
The Summit also agreed to the shifting of 100 US strategic bombers to 
conventional roles by removing their nuclear weapons and transferring the 
aircraft to bases where no nuclear weapons are stored. If warhead numbers do fall 
to around 3000 the number of weapons carried on heavy bombers is likely to be 
51. Brower, IIWhy the B-2 Will Bomb,1I p.20. 
52. The US Congress began the ratification process on 23 June 1992. 
53. See Einhorn, liThe Emerging START Agreement,1I pp.389-90 and Annual Report to the Pres i dent and Congress , 
p.60. 
54. See Robert S Norris and William Arkin, IIProposed u.S. and C.I.S Strategic Forces,1I The Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, vol.48. no.4, (May 1992): pp.48-49 and George Leopold, IISurrmit Agreement May Lead to 
Revaluation of US Forces,1I Defense News, 22-28 June 1992, pp.4,50. 
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around 865. 55 Although bombers retain their importance for the delivery of 
nuclear weapons the advantage bestowed by the counting rule will be lost as the 
size of the bomber force declines. This fact is readily apparent with the 
progressive scaling back of the B-2 force from 132 to 75 and then to 20 aircraft. 
Similarly there has been a contraction in the number of nuclear targets. When 
deciding on the 20 B-2 fleet, Secretary Cheney observed that "we [the US] were 
not oblivious to the fact that a number of targets no longer exist.,,56 The demise 
of the Soviet Union and the likelihood of substantial cuts in the nuclear 
arsenals of both sides has caused the US to consider changing the SlOP. A report 
commissioned last year by SAC commander and Director of the Joint Strategic 
Targeting Planning Staff, General Lee Butler, recommends that the US target 
roughly 5000 nuclear weapons (plus or minus 20 percent) at its potential foes in 
the next few years. Of particular interest is the Report's suggestion that a new 
SlOP structure be adopted which includes five categories of plans to deal with 
varying circumstances and contingencies. These include an option to use only 
high-precision, non-nuclear weapons in a strategic attack; plans for both 
"limited" and "major" nuclear attacks against the former Soviet Union; and a plan 
to hold on to a "strategic reserve force. 57 
In addition, the draft report advocates a controversial option referred to as 
"SlOP Echo," which would give the President a "nuclear expeditionary force" for 
attacks against China or targets in the Third World. A "handful of weapons" would 
be on day-to-day alert to execute these missions including the B-2 bomber. 58 The 
B-2s utility for such a role may still, however, constrained by the small force 
size and continuing doubts that the aircraft is capable of conducting a solo 
nuclear penetration mission in a sophisticated air defence environment. 
55. This assumes the USAF's future bomber force of 217 aircraft will retain no less than 100 nuclear capable 
aircraft. 
56. Cited in Opall, "Rice Pushes 20-Bomber B-2 Fleet," p.76. 
57. See Dunbar Lockwood, "Panel Calls For New War Plan," Arms Control Today, vol.48, no.1 (January/February 





given way to an unfamiliar period of 
are likely to be characterised by 
many cases to armed conflict, the 
The Cold War strategic environment has 
strategic uncertainty. The years ahead 
increasing regional tensions, leading in 
proliferation and diffusion of weapons of mass destruction and advanced 
conventional weaponry. To meet the demands of this environment the US has adopted 
a new defence strategy resting on: an effective strategic deterrent including a 
diverse mix of survivable, highly capable strategic nuclear weapons; retention of 
a forward military presence, albeit in reduced numbers; US-based contingency 
forces to ensure a rapid response to crises affecting US security; and an 
effective Base Force - the minimum required to ensure US security against a broad 
array of potential threats. 1 A key element in the evolving US strategy is the 
conventional role of strategic-nuclear systems. 
Until the late 1980s US strategy and force planning paid only limited attention 
to the conventional (or non-nuclear) use of strategic-nuclear systems like heavy 
bombers. Encouraged by technological advances in the ability of air-breathing 
systems to elude air defences, developments in reconnaissance systems necessary 
for rapid targeting and bomb-damage assessment and the increasing accuracy of 
conventional munitions, the Defense Department initiated in 1987 a DSB study to 
consider the potential use of conventional weapons to support US strategic 
objectives. The study's general conclusions were that conventional capabilities 
could be usefully applied across a wide range of contingencies and constitute an 
important opportunity that the US ought to exploit. 2 A year later the report of 
the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy added support for the efficacy of 
conventional weapons by noting that the prospect of technological innovations one 
day making it "practical to use conventional weapons to attack many ground 
targets that currently require nuclear weapons" was seen as the continuation of a 
broader trend. 3 
The dramatic changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and subsequent 
revision of US national security strategy have provided further impetus. For the 
1990s and beyond US security planners anticipate the following developments: 
the threat of direct, large-scale, conventional military attack in 
Europe escalating to a nuclear exchange will be considerably more 
remote given the demise of the USSR and Warsaw Pact; 
1. Annual Report to the President and Congress, (1 February 1992), ppvi-vii. 
2. See Barry D.Watts, liThe Conventional Utility of Strategic-Nuclear Forces," The Washington Quarterly, vol.14, 
no.4, (Autumn 1991): pp.178-79. 
3. See Fred C.Ikle and Albert Wohlstetter (co-chairmen), Discriminate Deterrence: Report of the Commission on 
Integrated Long-Term Strategy, (Washington, D.C., January 1988),p.40. 
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without the overt, immediate threat long provided by the USSR, US 
defence budgets, force-structure, overseas access and military forces 
overseas will be reduced substantially; 
as the world becomes multi-polar and as traditional ethnic, 
religious, economic,and political differences formerly overshadowed 
by US-Soviet rivalry reassert themselves, regional conflicts will 
grow more likely. 
At the same time, the US as the sole remaining superpower, will 
remain more engaged abroad than it was prior to World War Two and the 
increasingly interdependent global economy will be more vulnerable to 
regional conflict than in the past; 
the worldwide diffusion of advanced weaponry (including weapons of 
mass destruction) will change the relationship between major and 
minor powers, making it far riskier and problematic than previously 
for the US to influence outcomes in regional wars around the globe 
involving smaller states. Expeditionary intervention overseas by the 
the US will call for the most sophisticated US weaponry and 
capabilities. 
in sum, the need will remain for the US to have the advanced military 
capabilities necessary to deter or defeat aggression at points on the 
globe much closer to its adversary than to itself. 4 
This anticipated security environment for the 1990s and increasing focus on 
conventional uses for strategic-nuclear systems correspond closely with the USAF 
perception of the future. As described in the White Paper,"The Air Force And u.s. 
National Security: Global Reach-Global Power:" 
Conventional capabilities will remain essential to deter and 
contain local conflicts that could threaten U.S. interests 
and allies. Addressing these threats by long term occupation 
of the offending country, or continuous presence in every 
potential location, is highly unlikely. Instead, our probable 
response will be to stop or contain the offending behavior 
and isolate the threat. An ability to maintain constant 
awareness in potential adversaries that they are always 
within our reach broadens the spectrum of deterrence. Given 
this and the unpredictability of the future, our force 
planning calls for an increased emphasis on force projection 
capabilities-even more flexible, rapidly responding, precise, 
lethal forces with global reach. 5 
4. See The NationaL Security Strategy of the United States, (Washington, D.C., March 1990); The Air Force And 
U.S. NationaL Security: GLobaL Reach-GLobaL Power, Department of the Air Force, (Washington, D.C., June 
1990); NationaL MiLitary Strategy of the United States, (Washington, D.C., January 1992); and AnnuaL Report 
to the President and the Congress, (February 1992). 
5. The Air force And U.S. NationaL Security, p.9. 
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A central element in this plan is long-range, conventional airpower for which 
the manned bomber is particularly well suited. According to the White Paper: 
Conventional airpower offers exceptional flexibility across 
the spectrum of conflict .... The Air Force can deter, deliver 
a tailored response, or punch hard when required - over great 
distances - with quick response. We can provide a presence, 
or put ordnance on a target worldwide in a matter of hours. 
Long range bombers armed with conventional weapons can 
rapidly reach any location on the globe .... The bomber's long 
range means that the United states can project power and 
enhance presence in a very short time - and often at lower 
cost relative to other options regardless of conflict 
location. 6 
With conventional rather than nuclear missions becoming increasingly likely, 
the USAF has quickly seized the opportunity to promote the B-2, as an ideal 
candidate for conventional roles. Citing the 1986 raid on Libya as an example, 
Air Force Secretary Rice argues that six B-2s, operating from the US with the 
support of six tankers could have conducted the same operation which utilized two 
carrier battle groups, an Air Force F-lll squadron and numerous supporting 
assets. 7 
A comparison of two raids against an Iraqi nuclear facility during the Gulf War 
provides a more recent example in favour of the B-2s capabilities. The first 
mission was carried out with conventional, unguided bombs during daylight by a 
force of 60 attack, fighter, Wild Weasel and electronic warfare aircraft that 
required the support of 15 tankers. Due to smokepots around the facility and 
intense anti-aircraft fire, the attack was unsuccessful. The second raid was 
conducted at night with eight F-117As carrying laser-guided bombs and supported 
by two tankers. Three out of four reactors were destroyed the first night and the 
remaining facilities in the following week. According to Lt General Charles 
Horner, Commander of the Coalition Air Forces, two B-2s, each with 10 times the 
range and five times the payload of an F-117A, could have inflicted the same 
damage in a single mission with no tanker support. 8 
Confirming the importance now attached to conventional missions Secretary Rice 
testified to the House Armed Services Committee on 20 February that: 
6. Ibid, p.8. 
While the B-2 will retain its potential as a nuclear bomber, 
I have approved a new mission statement for the aircraft that 
reflects the priority we are placing on its conventional 
7. See Randolf, liThe B-2 Bomber," p.496. 
8. See David A Fulghum, "F-117 Pilots, Generals Tell Congress About Stealth's Value In Gulf War," Aviation Week 
and Space Technology, 6 May 1991, p.66. 
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role. The B-2 will hold at risk and, if necessary, attack an 
enemy's warmaking potential, especially those time critical 
targets which, if not destroyed in the first hours or days of 
a conflict, would allow unacceptable damage to be inflicted 
on the friendly side. These targets include emerging 
capabilities in some states for the production, support and 
use of weapons of mass destruction. The B-2 will also allow 
us to deliver a telling blow against massed conventional 
forces of an adversary threatening or invading a friendly 
state ... This role for the B-2 reflects not just its ability 
to attack high value targets but also a recognition of the 
value of time in war. Firepower that is immediately available 
carries great leveridge (sic). The ability of the B-2 to 
provide this leveridge (sic) in the face of modern air 
defenses around the globe reduces both the likelihood and the 
probability of success of regional aggression. 9 
Although the conventional missions envisaged for the B-2 and the manned bomber 
force per se, are plausible and now likely to find acceptance with Congress, 
there are a number of important issues that must be addressed. 
Foremost among them is force size and cost effectiveness. Given President 
Bush's decision to cap the B-2 force at 20 aircraft the question must now be 
asked as to whether a force of this size, or possibly smaller,is sufficient for 
more than limited operations. In January, Secretary Rice argued that with 20 B-2s 
the USAF could deploy two eight-aircraft squadrons with the remaining aircraft 
used for training and substitutes for aircraft in maintenance. With 15 aircraft, 
however, the USAF would "struggle" to field as many 10 in a single squadron. 
Moreover, with 15 aircraft the USAF could mount "only a handful of sorties" -
five or six per day at long distance. 10 While accepting that 20 B-2s are 
operationally more effective than 15, it is doubtful that the addition of 20 
bombers, albeit as potentially capable as the B-2, would alleviate the disconnect 
between the philosophical concept of increased reliance on long range 
conventional bombers in regional conflicts and the reality of shrinking 
resources. 
Illustrating this quandary is the fact that the USAF is not confident of being 
able to conduct two maj or regional conflicts concurrently. According to 
provisional commander of the Air Combat Command, Major General Stephen Croker, "I 
think we could well handle one major contingency" with bombers flying from the 
continental US "for a long enough time to let theatre forces get in place ... 
maybe 15 [to] 2 0 days." 11 The scenario would require a O. 5 sort ie rate, meaning 
9. Honorable Donald B Rice, Secretary of the Air Force, Reshaping For The Future, Testimony to the House Armed 
Services Committee, 20 February 1992, p.10. 
10. Donald Rice, "One On One," Interview with Defense News, 9 March 1992, p.30. 
11. See David A. Fulgham, "Force Drawdown Limits u.S. Ability to Fight Dual Conflicts," Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, 6 April, 1992, p.18. 
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each bomber would have to fly a long-range mission every other day. The force 
could undertake one Iraq-type conflict and still conduct "some damage 








bomber force generally, the USAF has drawn up the "Bomber Road Map." 
a force (excluding bombers in overhaul, test and mission spares) 
16 B-2s, 84 B-1s, 84 B-52Hs capable of carrying ALCMs and 33 B-52Gs 
armed with conventional bombs, the "road map" provides an insight as to how the 
bomber elements will interact for conventional roles. Using a scenario whereby 
the Iraqi army again invaded Kuwait but continued south into Saudi Arabia, the 
bomber force would be used in several ways to slow the advance. The B-2s in their 
limited numbers would lead the air fleet to strike high value targets such as key 
C3 I nodes and nuclear, biological and chemical weapons plants. Armed with the 
TSSAM and much shorter range Joint Direct Attack Munition System (JDAMS) B-2 
crews would also attempt to destroy key air defence nodes without overflying them 
and accordingly expand each bomber's area of coverage. The B-1s and B-52s would 
supplement the B-2s deep attack with additional stand-off munitions such as ALCMs 
and the Joint Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW). In short, the B-2 would attempt to open 
gaps for the B-1s and B-52s which would then act as "bomb trucks" to strike 
ground targets, particularly massed armour or personnel with their substantial 
payloads. 13 
The use of all the bomber force elements for conventional missions, while a 
practical response to limited numbers, will only remain feasible for the short 
term. The progressive retirement of the B-52 force in the late 1990s and early 
next century, along with real possibility that there will be no new bombers after 
the B-2 is deployed, indicates a stark future for the bomber force per see In 
addition, the costs associated with enhancing the B-1 force for conventional 
roles and maintaining a small force of "exotic" aircraft such as the B-2 are 
expected to be substantial. 
According to the "Road Map" the 96 B-1s will assume the majority of the 
strategic bombing roles and as the B-52s retire, become the operational 
"workhorses" in coming decades. When fully modified for conventional tasks, the 
B-1 will be used for stand-off attack against high value targets or for direct, 
precision attacks against medium or low risk threats. The problem, however, is 
that it will take more than 10 years and cost nearly $2.5 billion for the bomber 
to achieve its full range of conventional attack capabilities. 14 Similarly there 
12. Ibid. 
13. See Ibid p.19 and Fulgham, "Study Details New Conventional Role for B-2 Stealth Bomber," Aviation Week and 
Space Technology, 8 June 1992, pp.26-27. 
14. The USAF plans to spend $240 million next year to correct and enhance the B-1s problem-plagued defensive 
avionics suite and to commence modifications to the airframe to enable the launching of conventional 
weapons. In total the USAF intends to spend $1.1 billion to correct, enhance and support the defensive 
avionics suite and $456 million for conventional enhancements including new radios and computers. A further 
$912 million is tagged for development and integration of conventional munitions such as TSSAM, JDAMS and 
JSOW. See Barbara Opall, "USAF Seeks $2 Billion To Enhance B-1B 1 s Role," Defense News, 22-28 June 1992, 
pp.3,52 and John Boatman, "USAF Looks to Fix B-2 Stealth Hitch," Janes Defence Weekly, 6 June 1992, p.962. 
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are additional costs associated with the B-2 force. Although the cost of adding 
conventional weapons carriage and delivery capabilities are included in the total 
programme cost, the specialised shelters for 16 operational aircraft, as well as 
fuel cells and heavy maintenance hangars will cost $900 million. Moreover, there 
is concern that a force of only 20 B-2s will simply prove too expensive to 
operate. The logistic and maintenance problems experienced with the eight 
aircraft SR-71 reconnaissance fleet, are a case in point. 15 
15. According to Major General Croker, who oversaw the SR-71 fleet as SAC's planning officer, the eight aircraft 
cost more in operations and support costs for a year than three and one half B-52 wings. Cited in David A. 
Fulgham, "TAC Orders Studies On Uses for 15 B-2s Despite Doubts on Small Fleet's Viability," Aviation ~eek 
and Space Technology, 16-23 December 1991, p.21. 
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CONCLUSION 
The fate of the B-2 programme was effectively settled with President Bush's 
January decision that production would be limited to 20 aircraft. Accordingly, 
Congressional inclination to withhold funding for the remaining aircraft has 
dissol ved. In the most recent round of House discussion on the fiscal year 
1993/94 defence budget, a vote in favour of authorising a further $4.7 billion 
for the final aircraft was agreed, but conditional on Pentagon certification that 
the 20 bomber force will not exceed $44.4 billion and that the B-2s stealth 
characteristics work as advertised. 1 
As with nearly all previous attempts to introduce a new heavy bomber into the 
US strategic arsenal, the B-2 experience was no less controversial. Thirty years 
ago President Kennedy stated that the B-70 programme was "unnecessary and 
unjustifiable," while Defense Secretary McNamara agreed the increase in offensive 
capability offered by the B-70 was not enough to justify its high cost. For many 
these arguments remain valid in respect of the B-2, especially given the facts of 
the programme's vast cost and the small number of aircraft likely to become 
operational. With cancellation no longer an issue, however, the key question now 
concerns the adequacy or otherwise of only 20 aircraft. 
As discussed in earlier chapters, deployment of the B-2 does not appreciably 
alter a number of significant drawbacks in the manned bomber's nuclear role. The 
declining synergy between ICBMs and bombers and the latter's vulnerability to 
surprise attack are problems unresolved. Similarly, the argument that many 
hard-target missions designated for bombers could be performed by Trident II D-5 
SLBM or ALCM cannot be discounted. The primary mission for which the B-2 was 
developed - attacking mobile missiles - is technologically too demanding and may 
also have serious crisis and arms control implications. In short, the now reduced 
numbers of B-2 would not be adequate to perform their expected role under the 
previous SlOP. 
It would be unrealistic, however, to suggest that the B-2 in its limited 
numbers now has no nuclear utility . The security environment which is anticipated 
for the years ahead suggests that a limited nuclear threat cannot be discounted. 
Should such a threat emanate, for example from one of the newly independent 
Soviet Republics or a third world state, the small B-2 force could act as a 
highly capable deterrent. The new SlOP is likely to provide such a role. The B-2 
may also provide a degree of insurance against a resurgence, albeit unlikely, of 
confrontation with a reunited Soviet armed forces. Given the considerable number 
of nuclear weapons still held in the former Soviet Union the B-2 force would be a 
valuable asset to maintain until the arms control process is carried much 
further. 
1. See John D. Morrocco, "House Defense Spending BiLL Cuts Funding For Overseas DepLoyments , " Aviation Week and 
Space Technology, 15 June 1992, p.35 . 
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With regard to the utility of a 20 B-2 force for conventional roles, the new 
strategic environment provides considerable scope for conventional forces 
operating from the continental US. A key element of those forces is likely to be 
long-range airpower in which the B-2 would be a centrepiece. Although the B-2 
would be capable of conducting solo operations its limited numbers and high cost 
will likely see it used only in conjunction with other capabilities. Current USAF 
tasking policy indicates that this will be the method for using the B-2. A 
logical corollary, therefore, concerns whether or not the B-2 is too costly and 
sophisticated for conventional roles. Construction of a less advanced and hence 
less expensive bomber is an obvious solution but such an aircraft is unlikely to 
be capable of carrying out both nuclear and conventional missions. Arguably it is 
the B-2s dual-capability that offsets these disadvantages. 
In the present climate of strategic uncertainty a small force of 20 B-2 is 
adequate to meet the likely security contingencies in the years ahead. The value 
of the B-2 force lies not only in its ability to meet certain nuclear and 
conventional contingencies, but also in its contribution to research and 
development of advanced technologies. Finally, the B-2 will also provide limited 
cover against the decline in bomber numbers generally. Beyond this, however, the 
future of the US strategic bomber force may be difficult to sustain. 
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APPENDIX 1: 
B-2 GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 
DIMENSIONS: 
Wingspan 52.43 m (172ft 0 in) 
Length overall 21.03 m (69ft 0 in) 
Height overall 5.18 m (17ft 0 in) 
Wheel track 12.20 m (40ft 0 in) 
WEIGHTS: 
Weight empty 45,360-49,900kg (100,000-110,0001b) 
Max weapon load 22,680 kg (500,000 lb) approximately 
Max internal fuel capacity 81,650-90,720 kg (180,000 - 200,000 lb) 
Max takeoff weight 158,760 kg (350,00 lb) approximately 
ARMAMENT: 
Complete internal carriage on two Boeing-Advanced Applications Rotary 
Launchers with total capacity for 16 Tri-Service Stand Off Attack Missiles 
(TSSAM) or alternatively B-61 and B-63 nuclear gravity bombs, or 80 
conventional 500 lb bombs. Work is being underaken to configure the B-2 for 
carriage of the short-range Joint Defense Attack Munition Systems (JDAMS). 
The projected conventional delivery potential of the B-2 is: 16 2000lb 
bombs; 76 inertially guided 500 lb bombs; 16 precision guided 2000 lb 
bombs; and eight precision guided deep penetrator weapons. 
PERFORMANCE: 
Speed High sub-sonic 
Range unrefuelled 6,000 nm (11,120 km; 6,900 miles) 
Range with one refuelling 10,000 nm (18,520 km; 11,500 miles) 
POWER PLANT: 
Four 84.5 KN (19,000 lb st) GE 118-GE-100 non-afterburning turbo fans. 
CREW: 
Two, with provision for a third seat. 
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